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ABSTRACT 
The IEEE 802.16 standard is a wireless communications standard that holds great 
potential for use by the U.S. military.  As IEEE Std. 802.16 is a commercial standard, it 
can be used as a COTS solution for extending the reach of the internet down to the level 
of the individual soldier without incurring any development costs.  Additionally, 802.16 
“out of the box” supports end-to-end routing and is compatible/interoperable with other 
ubiquitous networking technologies such as Ethernet and IP.  Given the wireless nature of 
802.16, every soldier within range of an 802.16 Base Station (BS) has the potential to 
benefit from the flow of information from the Command and Control network, as well as 
the ability to contribute back to the network, increasing the situational awareness of all 
who are connected.   
While the default configuration of 802.16 has tremendous potential, it is at its 
base, a commercial standard.  There is a potential for modification of the standard to 
increase the usefulness of 802.16 for the military.  This thesis explores one such 
possibility by investigating the use of SNMP to obviate the need for a Subscriber Station 
(SS) to transmit, eliminating the associated risk of detection through signal tracking. 
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In the interest of better preparing the warfighter, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) has moved more and more Information Technology (IT) further toward the edge 
of today’s battlespace.  More and more frequently, soldiers of all stripes are finding that 
IT can be used in a staggering number of combinations to accomplish or assist in an 
almost unlimited number of objectives.  One technology that is finding its way onto the 
battlespace is the wireless networking standard developed by the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 802.16 and its accompanying technology: Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX). IEEE standard 802.16 describes a 
broadband wireless technology for Line of Sight (LOS) and Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) 
communication.  As most in the IT field are familiar with IEEE Std. 802.16’s cousin, 
IEEE Std. 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE Std. 802.16 is similar in concept yet able to transport 
significantly more data over significantly longer distances.  
In addition, where Wi-Fi is only useful at the edge of a network due to its 
contention based media access method, the media access method defined in IEEE Std. 
802.16 is centrally managed.  This central management of connections allows for a more 
stable network under heavy load, which allows IEEE Std. 802.16 to not only efficiently 
and effectively serve at the edges of a network, but for it to also play a role in the interior 
of the network as well as a backbone link between infrastructure and edge routers. 
While this backbone capability of IEEE Std. 802.16 is valuable, this thesis will 
focus on IEEE Std. 802.16 at the edges of the network.  One application for this type of 
communication is to have individual soldiers carry a wireless handheld device with which 
they can transmit and receive real-time Command and Control (C2) information germane 
to their particular battlespace. However, this new boon to the soldier does not come 
without a cost. The IEEE 802.16 standard is, by definition, connection-oriented. Both the 
transmitter and the receiver are in constant communication with each other negotiating 





these signals, there is a potential for enemy forces to use readily available tools to detect 
the wireless signals that an individual soldier may be transmitting and use those signals to 
zero in on the physical location of the soldier.   
The focus of this thesis is whether this increased potential for exposure can be 
mitigated using the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). SNMP is a 
networking protocol that can allow an administrator to collect data about and, more 
importantly for the purpose of this thesis, remotely configure networking devices.  This 
thesis will investigate the intersection of the 802.16 standard and the SNMP protocol to 
determine if some conjugation of the two can be used to dynamically configure an IEEE 
Std. 802.16 link such that a soldier with a wireless handheld device can receive data 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
We have come a long way since 1981 when Bill Gates was quoted as saying “No 
one will ever need more than 640K of RAM.”  We’ve come even further since 1943, 
when the CEO of IBM, Thomas Watson said, “I think there is a world market for about 
five computers.”  The fact of it is, no one could have predicted how useful or how 
ubiquitous computing power has become in our society.  As a result, countless industries, 
businesses, and markets have been developed all in the name of extending more and more 
computing power to the consumer. Yet, stand-alone computing power can only 
accomplish so much.  The real boon of the information age is the ability to interconnect 
computers and transfer information.  Metcalfe’s Law states that the value of a 
telecommunications network is proportional to the square of the number of users of the 
system (n2) [1]. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Metcalfe's Law 
 
   
So, while users will always be added to the network at a linear rate, the potential 
value of the interconnections between the users goes up exponentially. Driven primarily 
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by the end users’ desire, and willingness to pay, for more capability at the edges of 
networking infrastructure, the trend in networking over the past 30 years has been to 
disperse information exchange more and more widely.   
A prime example of this drive is the advent of wireless networking technology. 
Not content with having to move to the network, end users wanted to be able to carry the 
network with them.  In today’s market, it is almost impossible to buy a new laptop or 
PDA or telephone that is not network enabled.  Due to this hunger for more connectivity 
anywhere at any time the horizon of networking technology is a world where information 
exchange and global connectivity on a personal level will be the norm and not the 
exception.  One of the largest obstacles in this pursuit is the problem of the “last mile.”  
The “last mile” refers to the distance covered by the last hop from service provider 
infrastructure to the end user.  The high capacity links that make up the “backbone” of 
the service provider’s network are few and have relatively large capacity; however, the 
links that serve the end user are significantly larger in number and simultaneously smaller 








Figure 2.   Illustration of "Last Mile" 
 
Include the amount of networking overhead generated by numerous end users, in 
addition to the latency incurred by the many lower capacity links, and the problem of the 
last mile becomes obvious.  Another hurdle associated with the last mile is the 
infrastructure required to support it.  The last mile typically has a hub and spoke topology 
with service provider equipment acting as the hub for any number of end users.  
Traditionally these “spokes” are wires that are either strung overhead or buried in the 
ground.  These wired links incur a significant amount of cost in that they are susceptible 
to everything from weather to back hoes, not to mention the cost associated with crossing 
property lines to run cable.  The problems associated with getting high capacity links to 
numerous end users are not trivial.  Fortunately, an emerging wireless networking 
technology is looking to solve these problems.  This technology is the most promising 
network technology to emerge in the last ten years, geared towards satiating this hunger 
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for ubiquitous universal connectivity and dealing with the problem of the last mile, it is 
IEEE Std. 802.16 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) is a technical 
professional society with over 350,000 members worldwide [7].  The IEEE is a world 
leader in the creation of technical standards with over 900 active industry standards.  
IEEE Std. 802.16 is the definition of a wireless networking technology first published by 
the IEEE 802.16 Working Group in 2001.  Like its more common cousin, IEEE Std. 
802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE Std. 802.16 allows end users to connect to a network over the air; 
however, the capabilities of IEEE Std. 802.16 are significantly different.  IEEE Std. 
802.16 offers an ideal point-to-point range of 30 miles (50km) with a throughput of 72 
Mbps.  It also offers a non-line-of-sight (NLOS) range of 4 miles and, in a point-to-
multipoint distribution; the model can distribute nearly any bandwidth to almost any 
number of subscribers, depending on the subscriber density and network architecture [2].  
IEEE Std. 802.16 is the answer to a number of problems associated with the last mile and 
increasing the number of entities on a network.  The benefits are that it offers wireless 
connectivity, not in terms of feet, but in terms of miles.  IEEE Std. 802.16 supports 
broadband speeds, and, with the publication of IEEE Std. 802.16-2005, can be used in a 
mobile configuration where a Subscriber Station (SS) in transit can be handed off to 
multiple Base Stations (BS), similar to how we use cell phones.  In fact, it is likely that 
the next generation of cell phone networks (4G) will be based on IEEE Std. 802.16 
networks.  Sprint Nextel announced in 2006 its plans to rollout a nationwide 4G wireless 
network based on the mobile IEEE Std. 802.16 specification [3]. Since IEEE Std. 802.16 
has already shown itself to be of significant interest in the commercial sector, there is no 
reason why the armed forces too should not look to IEEE Std. 802.16 as a viable 
communications method. 
In that America is the sole remaining superpower, it is likely that the wars of 
tomorrow will no longer be fought like the wars of yesterday.  No longer is the winner of 
a war the side that can bring the largest number of guns to bear.  Today’s threats are 
asymmetric, today’s enemy cunning. Asymmetric warfare is a weak opponent seeking 
offsets against a stronger foe…Asymmetric threats will often exhibit a flagrant disregard 
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for fighting in ways we consider either “traditional” or “fair” [4]…” While asymmetric 
warfare isn’t new, the capabilities and raw destructive power of modern weaponry are.  In 
this new age, American forces not only have to fight with an agile enemy who can 
evanesce into the populace, but also with a system of traditional warfare that, while 
beneficial in previous eras, is slow moving and favors homogenous state-sponsored 
opposing forces. A strategy currently being employed to lessen our susceptibility to 
asynchronous warfare by leveraging our IT superiority is Network Centric Warfare. 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is an information superiority-enabled concept 
of operations that generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision 
makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher 
tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self 
synchronization [5]. The potential gains of NCW are numerous, but all rely on the 
network infrastructure that supports it.  In order to understand what quality attributes are 
important to a network supporting NCW, a hypothetical scenario might be of use.   
In this scenario, a Forward Operating Base (FOB) is established to define the 
front lines of a battle.  This FOB is near an enemy target of interest and it should be 
assumed close enough for the enemy to attack.  Among the number of soldiers are a 
handful of snipers or reconnaissance soldiers who are concealed beyond the perimeter of 
the FOB and whose job it is to collect intelligence on enemy movement and/or stand 
sentry to alert the FOB of potential ambush.  In this scenario it is imperative that the 
handful of forces that are deployed forward of the FOB perimeter remain concealed.  
Exposure of their position would create a life-threatening situation at the least.   
In performing the functions of reconnaissance, alerting the FOB of potential 
attack or in the case of the sniper firing upon targets of interest, NCW enabled equipment 
could greatly aid the soldiers in fulfillment of their mission.  Having NCW enabled 
equipment could enhance the soldiers’ capabilities by: 
• Allowing the reconnaissance troops, with the use of a webcam, to e-mail or 
stream pictures of enemy encampments in real time back to the FOB, which in 
turn could e-mail or stream that data back to a central command. 
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• Allowing a central command to update in real time a list of targets of interest, 
enabling snipers to be constantly aware of whom to look out for. 
• Allowing all forward deployed forces in the area of the FOB to have the same 
Common Operational Picture (COP), enhancing synchronicity of efforts, and 
in combination with a blue force tracker, reducing the chances of fratricide. 
 
So what are the characteristics required of a network to support NCW?  Wireless 
is a foregone conclusion as foot soldiers can’t drag wires behind them.  The network 
would have to be highly available. As peoples’ lives may depend on the network, 
availability is a cornerstone quality attribute. The network would have to be secure.  In 
general, network security can be thought of in terms of infrastructure protection and data 
protection; a NCW network should provide both.  In that the wireless links will probably 
be quickly saturated, the network should be able to do some Quality of Service (QoS) to 
ensure the high priority traffic always gets through.  All of these capabilities are available 
in the off-the-shelf form of 802.16.  High availability is addressed in the scheduling 
algorithm for traffic, which ensures that even under overload conditions the network does 
not crash.  802.16 has several security measures to ensure the infrastructure is secure (it 
should be noted that data security is better treated at other levels of the network as an 
end-to-end solution).  802.16 also supports QoS to ensure that voice, video and data get 
the services they need to function properly.  However, for all the gains associated with 
802.16, there are still some concerns about applying the commercial product in the 
military environment. 
IEEE Std. 802.16, as a wireless technology, transmits and receives signals 
through the air as its means of communication.  Both ends of the connection are 
constantly broadcasting back and forth to negotiate session parameters, exchange security 
information, and pass user data.  One potential downside of this constant back and forth 
is the risk of having the wireless signal tracked and used to compromise the position of a 
soldier or soldiers using IEEE Std. 802.16 technology.  With very little money and 
information freely available on the internet, potential enemies can easily assemble a 
device capable of tracking the 802.16 signals emanating from equipment used by blue 
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forces.  This thesis will explore the possibility of mitigating the inherent risk of IEEE Std. 
802.16 wireless transmissions by using the Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP).  SNMP is a networking protocol that can be used by network administrators to 
remotely configure networked devices.  As SNMP can be used to remotely set 
configuration variables, this thesis will explore the intersection of 802.16 and SNMP to 
discover if there is a way to leverage the remote configuration capabilities of SNMP to 
allow an 802.16 end user to receive broadcast data without having to transmit in 
response. 
A. SCOPE 
 This thesis will focus on the intersection of 802.16 and SNMP.  Since that 
intersection occurs in the software aspect of 802.16, hardware issues such as wave 
propagation techniques, regulatory constrictions, and vendor specific hardware 
information are outside of the scope of this thesis.  This thesis will provide an overview 
of both 802.16 and SNMP to provide a framework for follow-on discussion.  The setup 
and maintenance of an 802.16 session will be analyzed in terms of the required 
configuration variables needed to support communication.  These necessary values will 
then be compared with current SNMP capabilities. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 There has already been an adoption of IEEE Std. 802.16 technologies into today’s 
military.  Historically, the model has been that U.S. military forces adopt a technology, 
develop it for their own uses, and then, after the bleeding edge has dulled, release it to the 
commercial market (airplanes, radar, and small arms).  While this has worked well for 
military hardware, the acquisition of information systems has been another thing entirely, 
a good example of which would be the Joint Tactical Radio System(JTRS), a military-
developed wireless radio acquisition which, to date, is a decade behind schedule and 
billions over budget [6].  However, with IEEE Std. 802.16, this is not the case.  IEEE Std. 
802.16 has been developed in its entirety with the commercial market in mind.  The 
civilian designers never had to think about practical battlefield issues, so they did not 
design the 802.16 standard with any consideration that it might be used on the front lines.   
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 To be sure, the potential benefits of using IEEE Std. 802.16 on the battlefield are 
innumerable; however, those benefits currently come with a price.  A soldier using IEEE 
Std. 802.16 gear transmits wireless signals; these transmissions can be used by an 
adversary to locate the soldier.  The objective of this thesis is to determine if there is a 
way to mitigate the threat of exposure and prevent loss of life. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is IEEE Std. 802.16 (WiMAX)? 
2. Why use IEEE Std. 802.16 in the battlefield? 
3. Benefits vs. Wired/802.11/cellular technology 
(a) What improvements can we gain using 802.16 as-is?  
(b) What potential improvements can we identify which will not be addressed/ 
developed in and for the commercial world, and which will therefore rely 
on DoD investment to be realized? 
4. What is the problem with using 802.16 in the battlefield? 
5. What is SNMP? 
6. How can SNMP be used to solve the problem? 
7. By what means do 802.16 and SNMP interact? 
8. Can SNMP be used to configure a silent SS connection? 
9. Are there other possibilities which might accomplish the same ends? 
D. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins by providing background information on IEEE Std. 802.16, 
followed by an enumeration of the various sub-components of the IEEE Std. 802.16 
standard.  Chapter II ends with a walkthrough of a session initiation to highlight the 
numerous variables required to establish and maintain an IEEE Std. 802.16 connection.    
Chapter III provides background information on SNMP and will introduce the 
SNMP networking protocol and its relation to the 802.16 standard. 
Chapter IV discusses the direct intersection of 802.16 and SNMP.  In this chapter 
the current 802.16 capability in terms of SNMP will be explored.   
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Chapter V will state the conclusion of the research. 
Chapter VI will discuss potential alternate solutions for accomplishing the goals 
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II. IEEE STD. 802.16 
The 802.16 standard began as a project authorization request (PAR) approved by 
the IEEE 802 Executive Committee in 1999.  With the approval of the PAR came the 
formation of the IEEE 802.16 working group.   Contained within the larger organization 
of the IEEE, is the IEEE 802 LAN/MAN Standards Committee (LMSC).  This group, as 
its name implies, is responsible for the creation of technical standards relating to Local 
Area Networks (LANs) and Metropolitan Area Networks (MANs).  The LMSC is 
responsible for a number of networking technologies, the most famous of which are 
802.3 Ethernet, 802.11 Wireless LAN, 802.15.1 Bluetooth, and of course 802.16 
WiMAX .   
The original PAR submitted for Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) established a 
standard for use in frequencies between 10GHz and 66GHz.  This configuration, which 
would become known as IEEE Std. 802.16-2001, assumed a single-carrier wave, Line-of-
Sight (LOS) propagation, and fixed antennas on both ends of the connection.  Before the 
802.16-2001 standard was even approved, the Working Group had already begun 
discussions involving modifications to the 2001 standard.  802.16 has seen over a dozen 
modifications to its standard over the past decade.  Never seeming content with the status 
quo, the 802.16 Working Group has made a number of modifications to the standard to 
include operation across wider frequency ranges, NLOS environments, Mesh topologies, 
and mobile services.  The most significant of these improvements came in the form of the 
IEEE Std. 802.16-2005 publication.  For the first time 802.16 had a standard which 
addressed mobile users.  By defining a “handoff” mechanism IEEE Std. 802.16 entered 
the market as a viable cell phone replacement technology.  Looking toward the future of 
wireless communications in which everyone is connected everywhere all the time, the 
802.16-2005 standard was the first to deliver on the promise of truly mobile Broadband 
services.  
Today 802.16 is more useful, secure, mobile, and accessible than it has ever been.  
Due to the hard work of the 802.16 Working Group, 802.16 is poised to take a significant 
chunk out of the commercial market for Broadband access.  Without the limitations of 
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wired technologies and the relatively low cost of entry into the market for a vendor, 
802.16 stands a good chance of being the method of choice to address the last mile of 
tomorrow.  With more 802.16 standards being developed today, who can tell what IEEE 
Std. 802.16 will be able to offer in the future? 
A.  THE OSI STACK 
In order to understand the inner workings of IEEE Std. 802.16, it’s necessary to 
understand a few key concepts about networking technology. A useful model for 
understanding network communications comes in the form of the OSI Seven Layer 
model.  The Seven Layer model is an abstract concept model used to assist in the creation 
of, and integration between, the various different transformations data must undergo 
when passing from application to network medium and back to application.  The layering 
model is a fundamental tool that helps designers master the complexity of protocol 
software.  Layering divides the complex communication problem into distinct pieces, and 
allows a designer to focus on one piece at a time [8]. Since the model represents a vertical 
hierarchy, usually drawn as boxes stacked atop one another, a generic term for any given 
networking protocol is a “stack.” 
 
 
Figure 3.   Figure 1.  OSI 7 layer "stack"[9]  
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Another key concept is that of data units.  When information is handed to the 
networking stack by an application, that information is broken down into relatively small 
pieces.  These pieces are called Service Data Units (SDU) and Protocol Data Units 
(PDU), and are the basic units of information exchanged between layers of a protocol 
stack.  SDUs are the data units that are passed from one layer to the next within the same 
stack; PDUs are the data units exchanged between peer layers in remote stacks.  When 
Layer N has fully prepared a unit of data for communication to its peer layer on another 
host, the data unit is a PDU.  Layer N then uses a service access point (SAP), which 
defines the interface between each layer, to pass the PDU down to Layer N-1.  What 
Layer N-1 receives through the SAP is both the PDU of Layer N and the SDU of Layer 
N-1.  Layer N-1 then goes about the business of transforming the SDU into a PDU of 
Layer N-1, at which point it uses N-1 Æ N-2 SAP to pass down the PDU again.   
In abstract, when an application is ready to send data over a network, said 
application hands off the data to the Application Layer of the networking stack.  The 
Application Layer then prepares and hands the data off to the Presentation Layer.  The 
Presentation Layer then repeats the process and so on until the Physical Layer.  At the 
Physical Layer, the PDU is an electrical signal that is put on a medium (copper, fiber, or 
air) and transferred to a recipient.  When received, each data unit ascends the recipient’s 
stack in the opposite order, this time however, the SDUs are handed upward not down.  
At the application layer, the SDU being handed up is the recovered application data sent 
from the originating host. 
IEEE Std. 802.16 is a member of the IEEE 802 family of standards.  Like the 
other 802 standards, 802.16 is built upon a layered model for communications and deals 
with the lowest two layers of the OSI stack, the physical, and datalink layers.  The IEEE 
802 reference models expound the OSI model by specifying the inner workings of each 
layer, defining the interfaces between layers (known as the Service Access Point or SAP), 
and occasionally making a few nomenclature changes.  As will be shown in the following 
sections, while the OSI stack stops at the generic seven layers, the 802.16 standard 
actually defines several sublayers and the SAPs between all adjacent layers as well as the 
nomenclatures changes.  However, it is important to note that all 802 standards perform 
  14
in this way, and it is because of this modular nature that Ethernet has been able to survive 
for over 35 years of change in the IT and networking space.  Although several different 
PHY approaches have been evolved through the years (Coaxial, Twisted Pair, Fiber 
optic), Ethernet only required that the PHY layer be redrawn and not the whole standard.  
As 802.16 shares these same evolutionary modular properties, it too can make small 
incremental changes (swapping out one PHY for another) relatively easily as the change 
to the PHY layer, so long as it conforms to the PHY/Datalink SAP, and it doesn’t affect 
the rest of the networking stack. 
B. 802.16 – ARCHITECTURE 
Thus far we’ve talked about IEEE Std. 802.16 in abstract networking terms.  The 
OSI Stack and the transmission of SDUs and PDUs could apply to almost any networking 
technology.  The following section will focus on specific aspects of the 802.16 standard 
and highlight concepts that define IEEE Std. 802.16 as a unique networking technology.   
In a more familiar wireless networking environment like Wi-Fi, there is no central 
scheduler for access to the network.  In an ad hoc network each node has equal rights to 
the network and all nodes must contend with each other for network resources.  Introduce 
an Access Point (AP) for connection back to the Wide Area Network (WAN), and while 
there is a central point of aggregation, the AP does not control per se the nodes connected 
to it.  When introduced, an AP can send out a busy signal to help coordinate between 
distant transmitters, but each node is still on its own.  This situation can cause additional 
problems in that since every node is using the same transmission power, distant 
transmitters can be trampled by nodes closer to the AP.  In IEEE Std. 802.16 this is not 
the case. 
In 802.16, there are two transmitting entities, the Base Station (BS) and the 
Subscriber Station (SS).  Though both entities have instances of the 802.16 MAC layer 
and PHY layer, the BS and the SS perform different functions for any given connection.  
Chief among the differences between the BS and the SS is that the BS is responsible for 
maintaining many connections between many SS, while every SS has a connection with 
only one BS.  Even connections between neighboring SS’ must go through the BS.  This 
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centrally managed approach allows for scheduling of traffic, which mitigates the problem 
of end nodes trying to out transmit each other.  Due to the greater number of concurrent 
connections expected of the BS it is common to find that extra resources are dedicated to 
it.  It is also the BS which defines the characteristics of any given connection.  All SS 
must obey the connection rules provided by the BS.  This configuration has several 
advantages over a contention-based network in terms of scheduling, synchronization and 
bandwidth management. 
Chief among the benefits of the BS scheduling all communications is that at all 
times all nodes are synchronized as to when and how to transmit and receive.  This model 
incurs little to no overhead due to synchronization.  Since the SS rarely needs to spend 
time contending for services, the use of bandwidth in an IEEE Std. 802.16 
implementation is extremely efficient.  In a Wi-Fi implementation, the introduction of 
additional nodes to the network results in an exponential growth in collisions brought on 
by two nodes trying to transmit at the same time.  In an IEEE Std. 802.16 implementation 
this isn’t the case; i.e., no matter how many nodes are added, the BS is always in control 
of how services are allocated.  In an overload state, where a Wi-Fi network will fail due 
to the number of collisions, an IEEE Std. 802.16 network won’t.  Traffic may get 
“dropped on the floor” as the queues fill up, but the network itself won’t cease to 
function. 
Below is a summary of the roles and responsibilities delegated to both the BS and SS: 
BS is responsible for: 
• Enforcing basic MAC and PHY parameters such as frame size, ATDD, and 
configuration of system parameters 
• Performing bandwidth allocation for DL (per connection) and UL traffic (per SS) 
and performing centralized QoS scheduling, based on the QoS/service parameters 
configured by the management system and the active bandwidth requests (BW 
requests) received from the SS 
• Communicating the per-frame schedule to all SSs and supporting other data and 
management broadcast and multicast services 
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• Transmitting/receiving data and control information to/from one or more SSs 
within the same frame 
• Performing connection admission control and other connection management 
functions 
• Providing other SS support services such as ranging, clock synchronization, 
power control and handoff 
 
SS is responsible for: 
• Identifying the BS, acquiring PHY synchronization, obtaining MAC parameters, 
and joining the network if necessary  
• Establishing basic connectivity, setting up additional data and management 
connections, and negotiation and optional parameters and needed 
• Generating BW requests for connections that require such requests be generated, 
based on the connection profiles and traffic 
• Receiving broadcast/multicast PDUs and unicast PDUs and forwarding them to 
the appropriate modules. 
• Making local scheduling decisions based on the current demand and history of 
BW requests/grants, when a BS allocates bandwidth for the SS 
• Transmitting only when instructed by the BS to do so or the SS has some 
information that qualifies for transmission in one of the slots that may cause 
“contention” (e.g., ranging an dBW requests in contention or broadcast 
allocations) 
• Unless in sleep mode, receiving all schedule and channel information broadcast 
by the BS and obeying all medium access rules, transmitting data only when the 
BS allocates slots 
• Performing initial ranging, maintenance ranging, power control, and other 
housekeeping functions [7]. 
 
As should be obvious by now, it is the BS that is connected to the infrastructure 
network.  It is this connection to the network backbone, through the BS, that allows all of 
  17
the SS to connect to the network at large.  In commercial implementations of IEEE Std. 
802.16, the BS is usually located on the roof of a tall building.  This vantage point allows 
it to connect with SS either in a LOS Point to Point (PtP) configuration or in a NLOS 
Point to Multipoint (PmP) configuration.  SS can be either an antenna placed upon the 
roof of another building or a card inserted into a laptop or PDA like device.  One of IEEE 
Std. 802.16’s strengths is that it supports so many different implementation combinations.   
While originally created to support strictly BS to SS connectivity for fixed 
Broadband Wireless Access (BWA), over the years the 802.16 standard has evolved to 
include mobile stations and mesh topologies.  Though created to use the 10-66GHz 
frequency range, it has grown to include lower frequency ranges to support NLOS.  The 
802.16 standard has also grown to include advanced antenna configurations to increase 
capacity and range.  The 802.16 working group is constantly making changes to the 
802.16 standard to make it better than before.  There is no doubt that the BS and SS will 
continue to take on new characteristics and new implementation options. 
C. 802.16 – MAC 
To understand the IEEE Std. 802.16 MAC, it is helpful to expand on our existing 
layered model.  The 802.16 standard exists at the lowest two layers of the Seven Layer 
model, the Datalink and Physical layers.  It is worth pointing out that the model in Figure 
4 is a more granular view of the lowest two layers in Figure 3.  As such, layer two in the 
IEEE Std. 802.16 model is comprised of sub layers, respectively called the Service 
Specific Convergence Sublayer (CS), the Common Part Sublayer (CPS), and the Security 
Sublayer.  Also notice that in the OSI model, layer two is called the Datalink layer and in 
the IEEE Std. 802.16 model it is referred to as the MAC layer, which is an example of the 
nomenclature changes mentioned earlier. 
1. Convergence Sublayer 
The IEEE Std. 802.16 MAC CS is the uppermost of the MAC sub layers.  As 
such, it is responsible for handing SDU’s back and forth between itself and the Network 
Layer and handing MAC Service Data Units (MSDU) back and forth between itself and 
the CPS.  The MSDU exchange between the CS and the CPS is done by way of a service 
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specific Service Access Point (SAP).  This SAP defines the interface between two 
adjacent layers, and what services are available to the CS from the CPS.   
The job of the Convergence Sublayer is to format the various Network layer 
SDU’s by way of the service specific SAP in such a way that the Network Layer protocol 
is transparent to the CPS.  This has the effect of making the CPS “protocol agnostic” [7] 
in addition to ensuring that, should new Network layer protocols need to be defined for 
IEEE Std. 802.16, only the CS needs to be redefined and not the entire MAC layer.   
 
Figure 4.   802.16 Protocol Layers 
 
Another key aspect of the IEEE Std. 802.16 CS is that it must by definition 
support all services that the Network layer protocol supports, meaning that there is no 
compromise in functionality when introducing IEEE Std. 802.16 into a network.  For 
example, the IP protocol has IPv4 and IPv6, both of which are supported by IEEE Std. 
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802.16.  Additionally, any Quality of Service (QoS) parameters used by a Network layer 
protocol must be supported by IEEE Std. 802.16 
2. Common Part Sublayer 
 The IEEE Std. 802.16 CPS is responsible for the core MAC functions of IEEE 
Std. 802.16 such as medium access, connection management, and QoS functions.   
a. Media Access 
In a networking system there are a number of different hosts all 
exchanging information over a shared medium.  Whether that medium is in a cable, or 
over the air, all the different hosts that want to use that medium cannot do so at once.  
The event of two hosts transmitting at the same time within the same network segment or 
collision domain is called a collision, the end result of which is an unusable garbled 
signal.  In cabled networks, limiting the size of collision domains is achieved by the use 
of switches, which “switch” incoming traffic to the correct output port instead of 
broadcasting the traffic out every port.  In wireless systems however, by definition, all 
adjacent transmitters are in the same broadcast/collision domain.  Many different media 
access protocols have been developed over the years to deal with the problem of 
collisions. 
The most common is Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Detect 
(CSMA/CD) in which all stations connected to the medium listen to see if anyone else is 
transmitting before they attempt to transmit.  If two hosts happen to transmit at the same 
time and a collision occurs, the hosts will “back off” for an arbitrary amount of time and 
then try to transmit again.  While common, this type of media access scheme does not 
work with wireless devices.  CSMA/CD works well over cable because all connected 
hosts can see collisions and all back off the cable.  However, over an air interface, due to 
propagation properties such as fading and absorption, not all wireless transmitters may be 
aware that they are transmitting at the same time as someone else.  In the case of Wi-Fi, 
an Access Point (AP) can raise a busy tone to let all end nodes in the area know that 
someone is transmitting; however, short of the busy tone as a control method, all end 
nodes are on their own to contend for network services alongside all other end nodes.  
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Any wireless service that uses this method of contention for services will always be 
doomed to a significant loss of efficiency due to collisions.  The following sections will 
describe the ways in which IEEE Std. 802.16 deals with contention for the medium as 
well as methods for sending and receiving traffic between BS and SS.  
b. Duplexing 
  Duplexing defines the way bi-directional traffic flows between two hosts.  
Any given communications device is capable of either half-duplex or full-duplex.  In 
half-duplex, either host can send or receive, but not both at the same time.  In full-duplex, 
both hosts can send and receive simultaneously. 
c. TDD 
  Time Division Duplex (TDD) relies on assigning any particular host a 
time slot in which to transmit or receive.  This method is half-duplex, as a host can either 
transmit or receive in any given window, but not both at the same time.  In that TDD 
divides up the users in the time domain, it only needs to use one transmission frequency 
to work.  IEEE Std. 802.16 also offers Adaptive Time Division Duplexing (ATDD), 
which can dynamically reassign time slots to reflect the pressures on the network at any 
given time.  Using ATDD is efficient in the frequency domain as it only uses one 
frequency and is efficient in the time domain as it can dynamically reassign time slots 
where needed so no slots are wasted on idle hosts.  An IEEE Std. 802.16 BS coordinates 
the TDD slots by the use of Upload (UL) and Download (DL) MAPS.  CPS MAC 
Protocol Data Units (MPDU) will eventually be broadcast as PHY layer frames.  TDD 
frames broadcast by the BS begin with both a UL and DL MAP which define the time 
allocation slots for all communications on the network.  The DL MAP defines the DL 
subframe that is the part of any given frame dedicated to transmitting from the BS to an 
SS, just as the UL MAP defines the UL subframe.  The use of subframes and slots within 
the subframes to transmit or receive from BS to any given SS is how IEEE Std. 802.16 
manages the many connections required. In this way, IEEE Std. 802.16 gains great 
efficiencies of the available bandwidth as every slot can be dedicated for transmission 
and no two hosts will try to transmit at the same time.  
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d. FDD 
  Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) uses two separate frequencies to 
transmit and receive data.  This use of two different frequencies means that any given 
host can operate in full-duplex mode by transmitting on one frequency and receiving on 
the other.  FDD is very good at dealing with symmetric traffic, as the two frequency 
bands used are of equal bandwidth.  However, significant efficiency can be lost if FDD is 
used for asymmetric traffic where only one host is transmitting.  This imbalance 
effectively wastes the unused UL frequency band.  FDD in IEEE Std. 802.16 also uses 
frames, and these frames also use DL and UL subframes.  However, the major difference 
between TDD and FDD is that the UL and DL frames in FDD can overlap in time.  In 
TDD an end user gets all of the bandwidth some of the time, and in FDD and end user 
gets some of the bandwidth all of the time. 
3. Multiple Access 
a. TDMA and FDMA 
TDMA and FDMA are to Multiple Access what TDD and FDD are to 
Duplexing.  TDMA shares the communication medium by allow a particular host to 
transmit or receive only in their allotted time slot.  This method of media access is best 
used with a central controller that assigns the time slots for each communicating host.  As 
such, IEEE Std. 802.16 is a perfect fit for TDMA, as its BS can be the central controller 
to dynamically assign, in the case of ATDD, user time slots.  IEEE Std. 802.16 gains 
other efficiencies in using TDMA such as almost no contention on the network.  Through 
the use of the UL and DL MAPS, IEEE Std. 802.16 is able to ensure that no connected 
hosts will cause collisions by transmitting at the same time.  Even in the event that a new 
user wants to join the network, there are time slots in the UL subframe dedicated to 
network entry.  This means that any new host wanting to join the network needs only to 
listen for an UL MAP to determine when to send an admission request to the BS.  In this 
way multiple hosts can use the media with little to no overhead. 
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Figure 5.   Model of TDMA 
 
Figure 6.   Model of FDMA 
 
  FDMA uses a separate frequency for each host allowing all hosts access to 
the medium at the same time.  However, each host must have a channel sufficiently 
distant from other channels so as not to cause interference. Spectral efficiency must 
always be kept in mind when implementing FDMA, because while TDMA can 
dynamically assign time slots as network needs change, FDMA cannot.  FDMA also has 
a collision avoidance scheme in that no two end users will use the same frequency to 
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transmit/receive, and a frequency range is set aside for new users wanting to connect to 
the network.  It is important to note that both TDMA and FDMA can use either TDD or 
FDD. 
b. OFDMA 
  Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is a multiplexing 
technique that subdivides the available bandwidth into multiple orthogonal frequency 
sub-carriers [10]. OFDMA is a multiple access scheme based on OFDM.  Whereas 
OFDM multiplexes a single data stream across multiple sub-channels, OFDMA assigns 
an end user a sub-channel (or multiple sub-channels) and transmits multiple user streams 
at the same time over one frequency.  One of the main benefits of this method is that it 
can be controlled to allow any one user at any given time to have more of the sub 
channels than other users.  In this way, OFDMA can support QoS by allowing delay 
intolerant traffic to take up more of the spectrum. 
4. Connection Management 
 In IEEE Std. 802.16 the CPS is responsible for keeping track of and supporting 
the various over-the-air connections. There are a number of performance aspects of 
wireless communication that require constant adjustment and tuning for reliability.  Here 
are a few: 
• Initial Ranging and Sign On – When a user wishes to join the network, after 
listening for the appropriate time or frequency to transmit, there are a number of 
configuration values that must be negotiated between the BS and SS. Variables 
such as power levels, authentication, registration, frame size, all need to be 
communicated between BS and SS before the SS can join the network.   
• Bandwidth Requests – certain end users on the system may require more 
bandwidth to support traffic-intense connections.  The CPS needs to keep track of 
bandwidth assigned to specific users and from time to time, increase the allotted  
 
 
amount of bandwidth.  In TDMA this means assigning more time slots; in CDMA 
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this means more of the shared noise space, and in OFDMA this means allocating 
more of the sub-carrier frequencies. 
• Automatic Repeat Requests (ARQ) – The ARQ is a class of retransmission 
algorithms for supporting reliable delivery in the presence of errors [6].  ARQs are 
used when an end system notices missing or corrupt MPDUs in session traffic, 
and are a means to recover the original MPDUs so as not to degrade the session.  
As ARQ is by definition a two-way communication, it is outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
• CID – Most networking technologies use the 48bit MAC addresses burned into 
the Network Interface Card (NIC) to uniquely identify neighboring hosts.  IEEE 
Std. 802.16 uses a 16bit CID to identify information exchanged between the BS 
and SS.  This more compact form of identification is used in several ways to 
support and track information exchange between the BS and SS.  While the 
application of each of the following CIDs is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
important to recognize that the CPS is responsible for the management of all the 
various types of CIDs and that each serves a unique purpose over the course of a 
IEEE Std. 802.16 connection: 
o Initial Ranging CID  
o Primary Management CID  
o Secondary Management CID  
o Transport CID  
o AAS Initial Ranging CID  
o Multicast Polling CID  
o Padding CID  
• SFID – Service flows are used by the IEEE Std. 802.16 MAC to efficiently 
support per-connection services such as QoS [7].  When an IEEE Std. 802.16 SS 
is assigned its Basic CID, SFIDs can be mapped to that CID to support various 
service flows.  These flows are dynamic and can be modified at any time during 
the session on a per-frame/per-SS basis. 
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a. QoS 
  QoS, at its base, is recognition that different types of network traffic 
(voice, video, data) have different resource needs.  For example, data transmission is 
usually fairly delay tolerant.  Provided that there is adequate buffer space in the receiving 
host, data packets can arrive out of order or inconsistently and through various best effort 
techniques. Even if a packet is lost it can be accounted for and retransmitted.  Voice or 
video packets on the other hand cannot afford to arrive out of order or be retransmitted.  
QoS deals with the differences between network traffic types to help ensure that no 
matter what information is being passed over a link, it will be received in the way that it 
needs to be received.  QoS can commonly be measured as a function of: 
 Throughput: Throughput is typically specified in bits per second, 
although it can be also specified in bytes per second or packets per second, 
depending on the application. The actual application throughput depends 
on a variety of factors, including packet size, overhead and 
retransmissions. The achievable throughput is bound by the maximum and 
instantaneous capacity of the network, also specified in bits per second. 
 Delay: The delay, also known as latency, is the time taken for the 
information to travel from a source to a destination and vice versa. The 
delay is specified in nits of time, such as milliseconds. 
 Jitter: Jitter is the variation in delay. It is very important to many 
interactive applications such as voice and video. 
 Loss: The packet loss in any system is typically defined as a 
percentage. Data applications can tolerate some delay and jitter, but they 
cannot readily tolerate packet loss.  If a data packet is lost, it must be 
retransmitted by some layer (e.g., network or application) for the 
application to work correctly.  On the other hand, real-time applications 
such as voice and video can tolerate a small percentage of loss.  Re- can be 
used to compensate for packet loss at the cost of increased latency and 
reduced available capacity [7]. 
 
  IEEE Std. 802.16 has a number of ways to help guarantee a certain level 
of service for specific service flows.  QoS starts for IEEE Std. 802.16 in the CS.  As 
packets are handed down to the service specific CS, the CS is responsible for supporting 
all services of the higher protocol.  That means that, if the layer three protocol supports a 
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QoS mechanism, the appropriate CS must also support the same QoS mechanisms as it 
hands the packet down to the CS.  At this point the CPS can use a number of different 
techniques to efficiently order packets for transmission such as Admission Control, 
Traffic Classification, and Scheduling.  The SFIDs are used to track the various flows and 
assign resources to those identified and needing them. 
Bandwidth Requests are another method available to IEEE Std. 802.16 to 
support QoS.  As mentioned earlier, it is the responsibility of the SS to request more 
bandwidth when needed and the responsibility of the BS to assign network resources as 
they become available.  Using bandwidth requests an SS can help guarantee that its 
traffic is getting the resources needed.  In combination with the QoS capabilities of the 
BS, both ends of the connection can take an active part in supporting QoS. 
5. Security Sublayer 
The Security Sublayer was designed to secure the connection over the IEEE Std. 
802.16 link.  As the security methods are applied at the sending BS/SS and then stripped 
off at the receiving BS/SS, the security measures employed in an IEEE Std. 802.16 
connection do not persist with the network traffic outside the BS/SS to BS/SS link.  The 
primary focus of the Security Sublayer is to prevent Theft of Service (TOS) and, to an 
extent, Denial of Service (DOS); the secondary effect is to protect the data. 
The Security Sublayer of IEEE Std. 802.16 comes in two different parts.  The first 
is called Privacy Key Management (PKM), which, as its name implies, deals with secure 
key exchange between BS and SS.  The PKM uses X.509 digital certificates, the RSA 
public key encryption algorithm, and strong encryption algorithms to perform key 
exchanges between SS and BS [11].  PKM is how IEEE Std. 802.16 goes about the 
business of distributing keys between BS and SS to support traffic encryption. PKM uses 
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) to establish the set of keys it will use to encrypt payload 
traffic.  PKC relies on two different keys — the public key and the private key.  The keys 
are related in such a way that traffic encrypted by one can only be decrypted by the other.  
Each SS has a unique vendor supplied X.509 certificate.  This certificate contains the 
PKC keys that will be used to authenticate the SS to the BS.  When a new host sends its 
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initial request to join the network there are no shared keys between the SS and BS.  To 
establish encryption keys the SS must send the BS its X.509 certificate that contains a 
copy of the SS’ public key.  If the certificate checks out, the BS will then use the SS 
public key to encrypt a shared key to be used for future authentication and key 
generation.  When the SS receives this new encrypted packet it uses its private key to 
decrypt the message, which contains the Authentication Key (AK) between the BS and 
the SS.  Now that the BS and the SS have a shared AK, they can use that AK as the basis 
for creating more shared keys. Neither IEEE Std. 802.16-2001 nor IEEE Std. 802.16-
2004 specify a means for the SS to authenticate a BS, creating a situation where a 
malicious BS could be inserted into the network; however, IEEE Std. 802.16-2005 
remedies this situation by providing a mechanism for BS authentication.  By this means 
of key exchanges the BS can ensure that no unauthorized SS gains access to network 
resources.  The key exchange in the PKM process is also the base for the traffic 
encryption method in the Security Sublayer. 
The second part of the Security Sublayer uses a frame encapsulation protocol, 
which defines techniques for encrypting MAC payload data.  IEEE Std. 802.16 can use 
either Data Encryption Standard (DES) or Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to 
encrypt its payload data.  DES is a cipher that was adopted by the United States as a 
federal standard in 1976.  It uses a 56bit key to encrypt data that can then only be 
decrypted with the same key. Unfortunately, given Moore’s Law, DES’ 56bit key is no 
longer a computational barrier; thus, the encryption offered by it is considered weak.  
AES is another encryption standard adopted by the United States.  AES was adopted in 
2001 and has variable key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits, though IEEE Std. 802.16 only 
uses the 128 and 256bit key lengths.  AES is considered the current standard for secure 
encryption.  As they apply to IEEE Std. 802.16, DES does not provide data authenticity, 
or strong encryption; however, DES does not increase the size of the MPDU payload 
causing no additional overhead by its use.  AES, on the other hand, does provide strong 
authenticity, data integrity, and confidentiality while adding 12bytes to each and every 
MPDU transmitted causing a significant overhead increase. Both DES and AES require a 
key for encryption and decryption.  These keys used for frame encryption are all created 
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by way of the AK established in the PKM process.  There are, however, some noteworthy 
issues associated with the frame encryption concept. 
First, as mentioned above, encrypting the payload of a frame only supplies 
security over the relatively short hop of the local LAN.  If traffic needs to traverse a 
number of different networks to get from source to destination, any security at Layer 2 of 
the OSI model is only good for one specific Layer 2 link.  As no sender knows exactly 
what path their network traffic will take, trusting in Layer 2 security is a dangerous 
gamble as there is no guarantee that every link along the way will be secured.  
Furthermore, if one implements security at a higher layer of the OSI stack (for example, a 
Layer 3 Virtual Private Network (VPN)), then the Layer 2 security measure is moot, as 
the traffic is already encrypted when it enters the Layer 2 link.  It is for these reasons that 
the frame encryption capabilities of the Security Sublayer are ancillary to the TOS/DOS 
protections granted by the PKM process. 
As mentioned, the AK is created during the initial ranging period of a BS/SS 
connection.  The AK is used as the base for all other unique keys between the BS and 
each individual SS respectively. Security Associations (SA) are a set of security 
related variables that must be negotiated between the SS and BS before they can encrypt 
traffic.  When an SS sends its initial request and X.509 certificate to the BS, it also sends 
along a list of all of the SAs that the SS is capable of using.  The BS is then given the list 
of possible SAs, chooses one and relates that choice back to the SS along with a Traffic 
Encryption Key (TEK).  All connections between a BS and SS must have at least one SA, 
and all SAs must have at least one TEK.  The TEK is in charge of the keying material 
used for any particular SA.  For example if SA1 defines DES as the encryption standard 
to be used, the TEK for SA1 holds the 56-bit encryption key used to encrypt the traffic 
sent over that SA.  Although each BS/SS pairing has one unique SA, additional static and 
dynamic SAs can be created for new data streams on a one-to-one or one-to-many basis.  
Each MPDU is associated with an SA, and before it is transmitted, undergoes the 
permutations dictated by that particular SA and encrypted using the keys stored in the 
TEK for that SA.  Once the encrypted data is received, the receiving station uses the CID 
to select the appropriate SA for decrypting the data and recovers the original payload. 
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While the security processes and procedures used in IEEE Std. 802.16 are useful 
and robust, they ultimately come up short, as any security measure at the lower layers of 
the OSI model must.  A time-tested method of securing information has been to encrypt it 
such that only the sender and receiver can decrypt it.  While IEEE Std. 802.16 does use 
encryption, it can only encrypt the traffic that passes over its interfaces.  Unfortunately, 
encryption based security at Layers 1, 2 and 3 of the OSI model are not truly end-to-end 
security solutions.  For example, in a hypothetical IEEE Std. 802.16 implementation, the 
IEEE Std. 802.16 security is only in play for the brief time that the traffic is sent from BS 
to SS.  Before the traffic gets to the BS, and after the traffic is received at the SS, IEEE 
Std. 802.16 cannot protect the data.  It is noteworthy that IEEE Std. 802.16 security is 
more about protecting the infrastructure and avoiding theft of service, than it is about 
protecting the data passing over the network.  Data protection should start at the highest 
level of the OSI model, which would allow for true end-to-end data protection. 
D. PHY LAYER 
While IEEE Std. 802.16 has only one MAC Layer, there are several PHY layers 
defined in the standard.  The first of the PHYs published in the original standard for IEEE 
Std. 802.16 is known as WirelessMAN-SC and is a single carrier, point-to-point PHY for 
operation in the 10-66GHz frequency range. Due to the propagation characteristics of this 
frequency range, Line of Sight is an operational requirement.  Hence, one of the largest 
problems associated with WirelessMAN-SC is signal degradation brought on by 
inclement weather.  Another limitation of WirelessMAN-SC is that both the BS and the 
SS must remain fixed.  The characteristics make WirelessMAN-SC a good option for 
infrastructure links (replacing or obviating the need for some cabled infrastructure links), 
but unfeasible as a solution as a cell phone replacement technology. 
Toward this end, the IEEE Std. 802.16 working group has, over the past decade, 
created a number of other PHYs to deal with these issues.  The second PHY published is 
WirelessMAN-SCa.  This second PHY was created to work in the 2-11GHz frequency 
range, meaning that it could operate in a NLOS fashion.  Additionally, SCa included 
provisions for additional modulation techniques such as BPSK and 256-QAM, as well as 
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support for beam forming which with advanced antennas, could be used to focus and 
extend the range of SCa’s wireless signal.  So far, the PHYs available for IEEE Std. 
802.16 were single carrier, and while SCa addressed the problem of BWA by moving to 
the 2-11GHz frequency range, the single carrier scheme still had difficulties in a 
multipath environment.   
Multipath is a reality of wireless transmissions in that when a signal is sent out 
over the air it reflects off of physical objects in the environment.  Not only does the 
receiver receive the intended signal, but also the dozens of copies reflected off of objects 
in the environment.  These copies tend to interfere with the original signal, a phenomenon 
known as Intersymbol Interference (ISI), by their energy either constructively or 
destructively interfering with the intended signal.  The next development in the PHY 
addresses ISI. 
The WirelessMAN-OFDM PHY is based on Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplex (OFDM).  OFDM is based on a mathematical process called Fast Fourier 
Transform (FFT), which enables 52 channels to overlap without losing their individual 
characteristics (orthogonality) [9].  WirelessMAN-OFDM deals with the problem of 
multipath in several ways.  First the OFDM addresses all of the subchannels to the 
intended receiver.  As only a portion of the subchannels will degrade due to multipath, 
the relative signal degradation is limited.  Furthermore, WirelessMAN-OFDM uses a 
relatively large guard band between symbols to help the receiver distinguish between 
received symbols.  OFDM can use larger guard bands than a single carrier system 
because it is able to pack so much more information in a single symbol using the many 
subchannels.   
The next PHY standard released for IEEE Std. 802.16 is the Wireless-MAN 
OFDMA PHY.  Like OFDM PHY, the OFDMA PHY uses OFDM to multiplex 
numerous subchannels to be sent all at the same time, however while the OFDM PHY 
uses TDMA time slotting for multiple access, the OFDMA PHY uses the various 
subchannels to distinguish multiple SS’.  The OFDMA PHY is significantly greater than 
the OFDM PHY, both in terms of flexibility and in terms of complexity.  As discussed 
earlier, the OFDMA PHY can be extremely useful in its capability to reassign 
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subchannels on an as-needed basis to support QoS.  For this reason, the OFDMA PHY is 
getting the most attention in conjunction with the IEEE Std. 802.16-2005 standard for 
mobile systems, as they both represent the future IEEE Std. 802.16 in terms of getting the 
most amount of capability in the most amount of end users hands.  Since each new 
iteration of the IEEE Std. 802.16 PHY operates in the multipath resistant frequency range 
of 2-11GHz and the latest PHYs deal specifically with working in an environment rife 
with buildings and other obstructions, it’s clear that NLOS operation is driving the 
development of future IEEE Std. 802.16 PHYs.  This development trend is in line with 
the desire to make IEEE Std. 802.16 not just another, but the best option for the future of 
residential BWA. 
One additional note:  as stated, one of the benefits of a layered model is isolation, 
meaning that you can modify or improve one layer of the model without having to 
redefine the entire structure.  As is evident, IEEE Std. 802.16 makes great use of this 
capability, by constantly creating new PHYs to work in new environments.  So long as 
the rules of the MAC/PHY SAP are observed, new PHYs can be defined arbitrarily.  As 
creating a new PHY is relatively trivial, it should be noted that IEEE Std. 802.16 has little 
in the way of limitations in terms of wireless transmission methods it can ultimately 
support. 
1. Modulation 
One other PHY aspect of an IEEE Std. 802.16 connection is the modulation 
scheme used to send data over the air.  Modulation speaks to the way signal states are 
manipulated to convey information.  Modulation is nothing new and more familiar than 
one might think at first.  Frequency Modulation (FM) and Amplitude Modulation (AM) 
have been used in radio communications for the better part of the last century.  In the case 
of IEEE Std. 802.16, modulation is the same thing in that it uses state changes in a radio 
signal to convey information.  While IEEE Std. 802.16 could use FM and AM, these 
analog methods of modulation are inefficient by today’s standards because they only 
communicate one bit of data per state change (symbol).  The modulation schemes 
available to IEEE Std. 802.16 are 64-QAM, 16-QAM, and QPSK; all of which use 
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combinations of modulations to impart any given signal with more than one bit.  For 
example, using a sine wave, we can communicate one bit of information by changing 
either the amplitude or the frequency. However, if per symbol, we change the amplitude 
and the frequency together, we now have the capability to communicate two bits per 
symbol.  If we change the amplitude, frequency, and shift the phase, we can now 
communicate three bits per symbol, and so on. 
The various possible bitwise combinations useable by these modulation schemes 
can be represented in a constellation.  In the constellation for 16-QAM, each symbol is 
capable of conveying one of sixteen four-bit signals, for QPSK, one of four two-bit 
signals.  In using the various modulation methods a tradeoff must be recognized.  While 
the QPSK constellation can only carry two bits per symbol, the signals are relatively 
spread out and easy to distinguish from each other.  In the 16-QAM example, 
significantly more information per symbol can be sent, but the signals being used are 
much closer together.  In less than ideal transmitting conditions the closeness of these 
signal values can be problematic. 
 
 
Figure 7.   16-QAM Constellation 
 




In a wired networking environment, steps can be taken to ensure that the 
transmission media is in top shape, and free from interference at all times.  Indeed, 
modern copper and fiber cabling come with a number of innovations to ensure the quality 
of the signals passing over them at any given time.  Wireless communications however 
aren’t so fortunate; they are at the mercy of the environment.  Weather, obstacles, and 
other wireless transmissions all affect the potential quality of any single link. These 
factors, in combination with natural propagation aspects such as attenuation and 
reflection, combine to add noise to the received signal.  This noise can tend to shift the 
received signal so that it isn’t squarely over one of the available bit values.  IEEE Std. 
802.16 deals with this by dynamically choosing the right modulation scheme for the 
current transmission conditions, ensuring that the best connection available in terms of 
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) is the one being used.  In poor transmission conditions or 
over very long distances, the BS will choose the QPSK modulation method as it is the 
most robust against the effects of noise.  However, if the BS and SS are close and the 
environment is conducive to transmission, then the BS will choose the 64-QAM  
 
modulation, which allows for 8 bits per symbol.  Again, the BS can do this dynamically 
on a per SS basis, allowing for a constant system-wide best fit balance between range and 
bandwidth. 
E. CONNECTION SETUP 
Now that we have established some basic concepts about the inner workings of 
IEEE Std. 802.16, let’s take a look at how a connection is established to see all the parts 
at work.  The first thing an SS does upon powering on is refer to a list of available 
frequencies for use provided by the vendor.  The SS will then listen on these frequencies 
to see if there is a BS within range.  Note:  it is assumed that there is already a BS up and 
running because if there were not, the rest of the exercise would be moot.  Provided that a 
BS is in range, the BS will be transmitting the DCD and UCD messages at regular 
intervals. The DL Channel Descriptor (DCD) and UL Channel Descriptor (UCD) are 
specialized messages that describe the nature of the PHY scheme being used.  The DCD 
and UCD contain information such as PHY modulation, frame duration, and Forward 
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Error Correction (FEC) parameters.  FEC is a PHY level method of correcting errors in a 
transmission by adding redundancy to the transmitted signal.  DCD and UCD messages 
are important as each 800.16 PHY goes about initial ranging differently.  Another key 
piece of information needed by the SS are the frame preambles, which contain the DL 
and UL MAPs.  The SS will use the UL MAP to locate the initial ranging time slot or 
frequency advertised by the BS, in addition to the backoff method suggested by the BS if 
two SS choose the same initial ranging slot. 
Once the SS has this information and knows how to go about forming a 
communication with the BS, the next step is to begin the initial ranging process.  The 
initial ranging process begins with the SS sending a RNG-REQ to the BS.  The SS starts 
by using the lowest power setting available so as to not interfere with neighboring SS, 
and increases power incrementally as it continues to send RNG-REQ.  This will continue 
until the SS receives a RNG-RSP from the nearest BS.  When a BS successfully receives 
a RNG-REQ, the RNG-RSP it sends back to the SS will contain power, frequency, and 
timing adjustments for continued connection to the BS, along with the Basic CID, the 16-
bit number that will associate this SS with the BS.   
It is worth noting that, while the SS using the lowest possible power setting was 
originally devised as a means of preserving battery life, it has a beneficial side effect 
aligned with the goal of this thesis.  By IEEE Std. 802.16 SS using the lowest power 
setting, unlike Wi-Fi in which all end nodes transmit at the same power level, the SS 
make themselves harder to detect.  Effectively, to detect an SS using this output 
algorithm, a detector would need to be no further away from the SS than the BS.  Once 
the initial power levels have been sent, the SS will continue to use the lowest power 
setting until a change in the environment requires a more powerful signal to communicate 
with the BS, at which point the new lowest power signal will be chosen.  While 
clobbering other transmitters is not so much a concern due to the scheduling algorithm, 
this power saving method provides good transmission security as a bonus.  The next step 
of session initiation is the basic capability negotiation. 
The SS only comes with a certain number of capabilities in terms of maximum 
power output, modulation schemes, etc.  The basic capability negotiation is where the SS 
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communicates to the BS exactly what it is capable of, using a SBC-REQ message.  This 
message, when received by the BS, contains a list of all available communication options 
that the SS can support.  The BS then generates a SBC-RSP message detailing which of 
the SS capability options will be used for future communication.  At this point, the BS 
and the SS can communicate effectively; however the BS, though capable of 
communication with the SS, does not know if the SS is allowed to communicate on the 
network. 
The next step in the process is the authentication phase.  The authentication phase 
is managed by a number of PKM-REQ and PKM-RSP messages from SS to BS, and vice 
versa.  First, the SS sends two X.509 certificates to the BS, along with a list of security 
services that the SS is capable of supporting.  The two X.509 certificates are a 
manufacturer-signed certificate for the SS and the manufacturer’s certificate.  Using the 
manufacturer’s certificate (especially if SS and BS share manufacturers), the BS can then 
validate the SS’ X.509 certificate validating it as a legitimate network host.  The BS then 
uses the SS public key supplied by the X.509 certificate to encrypt the AK, which will be 
used as the basis for creating all future encryption keys between the BS and SS.  Next, 
the BS packages the AK, AK lifetime value, and list of SAs the SS can use and sends that 
back as a PKM-RSP. 
Now that the SS has properly authenticated with the BS, the SS needs keys to 
support the various SAs it will be using to encrypt traffic.  The SS sends a request for 
encryption keys signed with its digital certificate.  As the BS has already authenticated 
the SS, it uses the AK to create additional keys (TEKs) and sends them back to the SS.  
Now the SS begins the registration process in which the SS and BS negotiate high layer 
issues like IP version, and various QoS methods supported.  Once the registration phase 
is complete, the SS can request an IP address via DHCP, download a configuration file 
from a TFTP server (if managed), and get network time using the Network Time 
Protocol.  Once complete, before any user data can be sent from the SS, the BS sends a 
Dynamic Service Addition Request (DSA-REQ) to the SS.  As service flows are 
primarily assigned by the BS, not the SS, the DSA-REQ established the first service 
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flows available to a SS.  Once the DSA handshake is complete, the SS is a fully 
functional member of the network and can send and receive end user data. 
One stark contrast between IEEE Std. 802.11 and IEEE Std. 802.16 is that IEEE 
Std. 802.11 is contention based and IEEE Std. 802.16 is not.  The initial period — where 
the SS has received the UL MAP and knows the timing for its initial RNG-REQ — is the 
only time that the SS will have to contend for services from the BS.  It is possible that 
two SS will choose the same time slot to send their RNG-REQ; however, unlike a node in 
an 802.11 network, this will be the last time that the SS must contend with other nearby 
SS for BS services.  After the initial RNG-REQ has been received by the BS, a new 
allocation is provided to the SS and it falls neatly in line with all other nearby SS.  This 
fraction of time dedicated to contention in IEEE Std. 802.16 is one of the reasons it is so 
much more stable under heavy network loads.     
It is worth noting that the process for initialization was designed from the ground 
up to require as little end user participation as possible.  Both the BS and the SS have 
their specific roles and, between the two, the network sign on procedure happens ideally 
with no user intervention whatsoever.  Also worthy of note is that SS can come 
preconfigured to work with a specific BS.  This has the advantage of preemptively 
solving the problem of SS getting confused by too many closely spaced BS.  
Additionally, this also has the advantage of solving the malicious BS problem created by 
authenticating the SS to BS, but not the BS to any SS (though this problem was also 













Since the early days of the Internet, the number of end users has grown rapidly 
and shows no sign of stopping. As the number of users has grown, so has the number of 
infrastructure devices supporting them.  In the early days of the internet, as in any small 
network, it was feasible for a network administrator, by means of constantly logging into 
and reviewing log data, to manage the networking devices.  However, this method can 
only be considered useful in the smallest of networks.  When networks grow to thousands 
of hosts and hundreds of infrastructure components (routers, switches, hubs, firewalls, 
etc.), a network management scheme becomes necessary. 
B. NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
Network management has been studied extensively over the last twenty years.  
One beneficial outcome of that continued study and refinement is the subdivision of 
Network Management into five logical groupings.  The groupings are Fault Management, 
Configuration Management, Accounting Management, Performance Management, and 
Security Management, known together as FCAPS.  FCAPS today is the most common 
framework to address the minimum standard of considerations when implementing a 
network management scheme. 
Fault Management – “fault management detects, locates, and corrects problem in 
the network hardware and software [11].” FM makes a distinction between errors and 
faults in that a number of errors are expected in any given network, however any severe 
event or the accumulation of a number of errors can be considered a fault.  In order for 
FM to work, all of the managed devices must have an established baseline of operation.  
It is the deviation from this established baseline that can trigger a fault event, which then 
initiates other related processes to correct the recorded fault.  While the ultimate goal is to 
be one step ahead of faults (a point we will soon come to), FM deals with the efficient, 
timely detection and remediation of a fault. 
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Configuration Management – Configuration Management (CM) deals with not 
only the individual configurations of managed devices on a network, but also the 
configuration of the network itself.  Good CM keeps a current record of the configuration 
of all managed devices.  Furthermore CM records what changes are made, when the 
changes are made, and by whom.  This accounting for movement on the network can be 
invaluable during an unexpected failure.  With proper CM in place, it is a trivial matter to 
review all of the recent changes on the network to see if the problem was caused by a 
rogue configuration entry.  CM is also concerned with the topology of the network.  The 
topology of the network is a representation of how all the varied devices interconnect 
with one another.  In a network this information is paramount, as the flow of data from 
device to device can be seriously impacted by a network path being moved from one 
location to another. 
Accounting Management – Accounting Management deals with tracking end 
users and recording their resource usage.  Primarily the interest of billing departments in 
a business sense, in networking, AM measures the volume of traffic a user is exchanging 
over the network, or the amount of time a user is connected to the network, and whether 
that user is causing an undue burden to the network.  This information can then be turned 
into a billing summary to charge an end user appropriately for usage of networking 
resources, or be used as justification for removing the end user from the network.  
Additionally, AM can be used for forecasting network demands.  Using the metrics 
collected, a network manager can see the gradual climb in network usage over time, 
which he or she can then present to upper management as a justification for more 
equipment etc. 
Performance Management – Whereas, as mentioned earlier, FM answers the 
question of what to do when a fault occurs, Performance Management (PM) is concerned 
with how well the network is functioning before a fault occurs.  PM allows a network 
manager to be proactive in fault detection instead of reactive. PM is also a very good tool 
to use for forecasting.  Instead of looking at traffic on a per user basis, PM is concerned 
with the overall traffic patterns over the entire network and can be used to chart changes 
over time allowing a network manager to anticipate future requirements.  PM uses 
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metrics like throughput (amount of information exchanged over time) and latency 
(measure of elapsed time from request to expected response) to measure the health of a 
network and the devices in it.  Using these metrics a network manager can “tune” his or 
her network to get the most out of it or align networking resources to high traffic areas. 
Security Management – Security Management deals with access to various 
systems.  SM involves the process of keeping track of who has access to what and 
ensuring that users can only get to the resources they are allowed to use.  Least Privilege 
is a useful security related concept that states that a user should have just so much access 
such that they can perform their required tasks, and no more.  SM is a useful method to 
help enforce Least Privilege and to keep the network secure from both inside and outside 
threats. 
C. SNMP HISTORY 
 Though SNMP was originally created to deal with Fault Management and 
Configuration Management, over the years it has grown to include the three remaining 
aspects of the model.  Shortly we will see how SNMP aligns with the FCAPS model; 
however, as the discussion of SNMP thus far has been generic, several specific concepts 
must be examined before we can continue.   
In 1988, we saw the first implementation of Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP), a networking protocol geared towards the end of creating a simple 
management method where administrators could efficiently manage a large number of 
remote assets.  While SNMP was originally created as a stop gap measure until a better 
management protocol was created it has over time become the de facto standard for 
network management around the world [12].  
SNMP was originally conceived to manage the bridges, routers and gateways that 
made up the backbone of the early internet.  As an evolution of Simple Gateway 
Management Protocol (SGMP), it was designed to exchange rudimentary operating 
statistics of early networking devices and provide a format to transmit management 
messages.  Today, everything from routers to printers to internet-enabled refrigerators 
can be managed by this lightweight open-standard protocol. 
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SNMP is capable of enabling and disabling ports on a router or switch, it can tell 
a manager how many bytes have passed through a particular interface, and it can even 
record and monitor the operating temperature of particular assets.  Furthermore, SNMP is 
not only capable of managing hardware assets; increasingly software applications 
(including Operating Systems) are being produced with SNMP capability built in by 
manufacturers.  
SNMP is published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (ITEM), an open 
standards body that creates internetworking standards.  The IETF uses Request for 
Comments (RFC) as a means of submittal and tracking bodies of work on their way to the 
“standard” status.  RFCs number assignments are permanent; as such, older RFCs are 
superseded by newer RFCs and given the status of “historical.”  The first version of 
SNMP, SNMPv1, was established by RFC 1157 and is now considered historical.  
SNMPv2 was first implemented in 1996 and is considered historical as well.  The only 
current SNMP standard is SNMPv3, which was first introduced in 2002.   
Each new iteration of SNMP builds off of the foundations of the previous version.  
SNMPv1 was a very simple scheme for recording and collecting management data from 
network assets.  As such, the number of distinct data elements turned out to be lacking 
and, while there were efforts to include security into the model, the working group could 
not decide on a singular solution.  Consequently, the working group pushed SNMPv1 out 
the door with a weak security implementation, believing it better to have a security 
deficient version of SNMP than no version at all.  SNMPv1 authenticated messages from 
manager to managed asset by using a “community string” which is little more than a 
password known to both the manager and the managed asset.  The critical flaw in 
SNMPv1 security is that when messages were sent between SNMP entities they were 
sent “in the clear,” meaning that a community string was put on the wire exactly as it was 
typed, without encryption.  This allowed for anyone connected to the network to “sniff” 
the SNMP traffic and easily learn the community names used.  Keeping in mind that 
anyone armed with the appropriate community string could tell the networking 
equipment to shut off ports or redirect traffic, an unauthorized user could cause complete 
havoc. This limitation inherent in SNMPv1 persisted for nearly a decade until the 
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publication of SNMPv2.  The saving grace for SNMPv1 was that most operators could 
hide their SNMPv1 implementations behind a firewall so that no outside entity could 
exploit the inherent weakness, however it still remained an issue as those connected to 
the internal trusted network could still easily discover the community strings. 
SNMPv2 was built upon the framework of SNMPv1 by including additional 
management variables, additional security options, and several other improvements.  
However, the security implementation introduced in SNMPv2 turned out to be unwieldy 
and was ultimately rejected by the user community at large.  Though SNMPv2 had new 
and improved management variables and new and improved ways to access those new 
variables, community strings still persisted.  In fact the most common usage of SNMPv2 
is SNMPv2c, the “c” connoting the use of community strings. 
SNMPv3 is the long awaited answer to the problem of community strings.  While 
SNMPv3 continues to build on the foundations laid by SNMPv1 and SNMPv2, it makes 
its significant contribution in the form of secure connections between manager and 
managed assets.  For all practical purposes, security is the only enhancement issue 
SNMPv3 addresses; there are no other changes to the protocol [13].  That said, SNMPv3 
also updates some of the terminology used when speaking about SNMP.  While security 
was not a major concern for v1 and could not be agreed upon by the release of v2, 
SNMPv3’s single greatest contribution to the protocol was the implementation of a 
security scheme, which required proper authentication and authorization between NMS 
and Agent.  Additionally SNMP3 no longer sends community names across the wire in 
the clear. 
D. SNMP COMMUNICATIONS 
At its base, SNMP is a means to transmit management messages over a network.  
Thus far, the discussion has only referred in a very generic manner either to the players in 
that exchange or to the actual management messages themselves.  The two network 
entities involved in the exchange of messages are the SNMP Agent and the SNMP 
Network Management Station (NMS).  The SNMP Agent is what actually sends and 
receives messages from the managed assets and the NMS is what the network 
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administrator will interface with to manage said assets.  The values that are exchanged 
and modified in SNMP are stored in the Management Information Base or MIB. 
Since SNMP was designed with simplicity in mind the number of messages that 
can be exchanged between NMS and Agent is quite small.  In SNMPv1 only five 
management messages were defined: 
• Get – The Get message was sent from the NMS to the Agent to retrieve a specific 
value of a management variable monitored by the Agent. 
• Set – The Set message was sent from the NMS to the Agent to modify a specific 
value of a management variable monitored by the Agent. 
• Get-Next – The Get-Next command can be used to return a series of management 
variable values instead of just one. 
• Get-Response – The Get-Response is the first of the Agent to NMS messages.  
This message is the response to either a Get or a Get-Next NMS request. 
• Trap – Traps are automated messages sent from Agent to the NMS in response to 
some environment variable changing. 
SNMPv2 introduced the following additional messages: 
• GetBulk – GetBulk is a more efficient form of GetNext.   
• Inform – The inform message was added to SNMPv2 to allow inter NMS 
communications.  For the first time NMS could communicate with another NMS 
which provided the possibility of NMS hierarchies to manage large networks. 
 
Though few in number, these messages are very powerful in that they: allow a 
network administrator to view almost any configuration or state variable on any number 
of devices, allow an administrator to remotely configure any number of devices, and 
provide automated alarming in the event of failures or the anticipation of failures.  
However, an administrator cannot be available to direct this process all the time.  One of 
the greatest benefits of SNMP is that of automation.  One of the greatest examples of this 
automation is trapping and polling. 
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 Trapping and polling refer to the ways in which an NMS can keep an eye on the 
state of the network.  Traps are sent when the value of a managed object goes outside a 
predefined threshold.  It is important to note that the setting of thresholds is one of the 
most important aspects of managing a network with SNMP.  If thresholds are set too high 
then faults could be regularly happening without any notification being sent to the NMS, 
rendering SNMP effectively useless.  Set the thresholds too low and trap after trap after 
trap will be sent to the NMS, not only clogging up the network, but also creating a flood 
of information that then must be parsed to discover genuine problems.  Network 
managers must take great care to set thresholds in that narrow window of generating not 
so few traps that faults are overlooked, and not so many traps that faults are lost in the 
deluge. In the polling approach, the NMS will regularly poll the Agent for relevant state 
information.  This way, the NMS has a near real-time picture of the state of the whole 
network and the assets contained within it.  Additionally, repeated polls over time can 
reveal patterns in the network that the NMS can then use to refine its polling process, 
allocating the largest resources to the most problematic areas of the network.  The 
downside of polling comes in when an NMS becomes responsible for hundreds or 
thousands of assets.  The constant polling messages sent out to keep up with the network 
can flood the network with traffic.  This can not only overwhelm the NMS which 
constantly has to process requests and receipts of state information, but can exhaust 
network resources as well.  A third option is Trap directed polling which uses the 
strengths of both Traps and Polling to offset their weaknesses. Each agent on the network 
has well-defined state variables that it is responsible for managing.  Each of these 
variables has a corresponding threshold.  In the event that a threshold is crossed, the 
Agent can send a trap message to the NMS to inform it that a significant event has 
occurred.  This method has the advantage of not putting messaging traffic on the network 
unless there is an actual problem, and, unlike the polling method, the results are in real 
time, as the traps are sent off immediately after the detection of a problem.  The 
disadvantage of this method is that it is costly to the agent, which often is a very small 
piece of code with limited resources.  Also, if the thresholds are not tuned appropriately, 
the agent can flood the network with message after message.  Another disadvantage to 
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this method is that, should a networking device fail, the agent cannot then use the 
network to report to the NMS; in which case, the NMS is never notified of a potentially 
catastrophic failure on the network.  In Trap directed polling, however, this is only half 
the story.  To address the shortcomings of just trapping network events, Trap directed 
polling polls at a very low frequency to ensure that it can still communicate with every 
Agent and, as such, is not missing potential messages.  This low frequency polling does 
not produce enough traffic to overwhelm the network or the NMS, and ensures that, if an 
Agent is unable to communicate a fault to the NMS, that the NMS becomes aware of the 
situation anyway.  Additionally, in Trap directed polling, once a trap is received the NMS 
has the option to abandon the low frequency polling and start polling in a more probing 
fashion to those devices closest to the reported fault. 
 As mentioned previously, this all happens without the intervention of a network 
manager.  Once the crucial step of setting up the Agent thresholds and the polling policy 
on the NMS has been completed a fair amount of automation is expected.  Network 
administrators can even tie SNMP into SMS messages such that when faults or 
significant events happen on their networks, they can be notified via their cell phone or 
pager.  Truly SNMP goes a long way toward supporting the goal of increased uptime in a 
network.  Thus far, the discussion has been about how SNMP goes about exchanging 
messages. The following section will explore what the nature of those messages is as well 
as what information is passed in them. 
 In SNMPv1 the format for all of the messages was the same, except for the trap 
message.  With the publication of SNMPv2, all SNMP messages were formatted to look 
exactly the same, only by reading the PDU type indicator, or command number, could an 
Agent or NMS distinguish the specific purpose of any particular SNMP message.  As will  
 
 
be explained shortly the uniformity of SNMP turns out to be another one of its strengths.  
This uniformity is provided by the use of the Structure of Management Information 
(SMI).   
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 While the SNMP protocol deals with the exchange of management messages, the 
messages must be exchanged by software entities.  The SNMP Agent is the software 
entity on the managed asset and the Network Management Station (NMS) is the software 
entity installed on the centralized host a network administrator uses to manage the 
network.  SNMP uses UDP an OSI Layer 4 transport protocol that is connectionless and 
relies on the application layer protocol to ensure delivery.   
 UDP is a connectionless, and therefore unreliable protocol; for example, it does 
not support acknowledgement.  There is no built in capability for detecting and 
retransmitting lost packets; UDP datagrams are “fire and forget.”  Using TCP, the 
connection-oriented and reliable Layer 4 transport protocol, might seem like a better idea 
at first glance however, there are some specific properties of UDP that make it a better fit.  
First of all, UDP is lightweight.  Not only are the UDP datagrams smaller than TCP 
datagrams, but UDP datagrams will never require an acknowledgement or response.  In a 
busy network where SNMP traffic is constantly going back and forth between Agents and 
the NMS, the small overhead of UDP makes it the better fit.  If there was a network fault 
that severed communications, TCP would continually try to retransmit until it received an 
acknowledgement, possibly flooding the network. UDP, however, in the case of SNMP, 
would simply fire and forget the datagram, and leave it up to SNMP to decide how it 
wants to deal with a lack of response (which would be to wait for a specific amount of 
time and then transmit another UDP datagram).  Both the Agent and the NMS of SNMP 
live at the top, or Application layer of the OSI model.  SNMP uses UDP port 161 for 
polling and port 162 for traps. 
1. MIB 
 MIBs are specifications containing definitions of management information so that 
networked systems can be remotely monitored, configured, and controlled [14].  They can 
be thought of as the database of system variables that can be monitored or configured by 
SNMP.  The framework of that database is known as the Structure of Management 
Information (SMI), which uses the Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) to describe 
and define what variables can be monitored, how those variables are stored, and the 
syntax for messages communicating the status or seeking to modify those variables.  If 
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ASN.1 were a language (which to an extent it is) SMI would be the grammar rules used 
to create MIBs.  SMI, using a subset of ASN.1, defines the allowed data types in a MIB, 
the rules for specifying object types, and the rules for defining the events that trigger an 
SNMP response.  This common language and common grammar for the creation of MIBs 
and MIB variables is extremely powerful in that it allows anyone to create a MIB that is 
then interoperable with any SNMP implementation.  From this framework, any number 
of variables can be defined for any number of different assets be they hardware or 
software. 
 All of the various types of management information that can be stored in a MIB 
are called objects.  Any specific instance of an object is called a variable, and it is the 
values contained in the variables that SNMP monitors and modifies.  Objects are defined 
by their data types, access type, identity, behaviors and how individual instances of the 
object are identified.  There are two types of objects in the SNMP MIB: the scalar object 
and the columnar object.  Columnar objects can have zero or more variables stored in 
them at any one time and are stored in a logical data table as defined by SMI.  Individual 
instances are identified by an indexing scheme defined for that object type.  An example 
of a columnar object would be the instances of the physical ports on a networking device, 
as there may be between two and several dozen.  Scalar objects, on the other hand, are 
objects of which there can be one and only one possible instance.  For example, “system 
uptime since last reboot” refers to a constant count of seconds elapsed since the device 
was last rebooted, for which there can be only one value.  There is no index required for 
these instances, as they are unique.  Any and all SNMP objects are divided up between 
these two types of object; however, to identify any particular MIB variable one must look 
to the Object Identifier (OID). 
 In order for the panoply of existing MIB objects to be quickly referenced, a 
hierarchical numbering and naming scheme was devised to track them.  The naming 
scheme is simply an extension of the numbering scheme to make the long chains of 
numbers that make a particular OID human readable.  As shown in the diagram below, 
the location of any particular MIB object can be located by using the numbers in its tree; 
this value is also known as “the identity of the object.”  Only the objects at the bottom of 
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the tree (also known as a leaf) can contain values.  So the OID 1.3.6.1.2.1 or 
iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2 contains no values to query or configure, but the OID 
1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2 or iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.interfaces.2 would.  It is also worth 
noting that for the last example the final number connotes the second instance of 
interface, the next entry would be 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.3 and so on.  For scalar objects, the final 
numeral value is always 0 as there are not multiple instances to enumerate.  For example, 
the OID for system uptime is 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.3.0 or iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-
2.system.sysUptime.0.  Thus far the examples used have all come from 
1(iso).3(org).6(dod).1(internet).2(mgmt).1(mib-2); the reason is that the mib-2 subtree 
has special significance in SNMP.  MIB-II, as it is formally known, is currently the 
minimum standard of variables any system using SNMP must use.  Every device using 
SNMP must use MIB-II.  MIB-II contains the following subtrees: 
-- groups in MIB-II 
 
          system       OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 1 } 
 
          interfaces   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 2 } 
 
          at           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 3 } 
 
          ip           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 4 } 
 
          icmp         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 5 } 
 
          tcp          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 6 } 
 
          udp          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 7 } 
 
          egp          OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 8 } 
 
          -- historical (some say hysterical) 
          -- cmot      OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 9 } 
 
          transmission OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 10 } 
 
          snmp         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mib-2 11 }[15]  
 
 Other than MIB-II, any particular implementation of SNMP is free to use 
whatever other MIBs are appropriate.  As mentioned earlier, MIBs can be defined by 
anyone making them indefinitely extensible.  Another important subtree to know is the 
private subtree located at 1.3.6.1.4 or iso.org.dod.internet.private.  This subtree contains 
all of the privately developed MIBs created by individuals, institutions, organizations, 
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companies, etc. to manage a particular asset.  Currently the list of contributions to the 
private tree is registered by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). For 
example Cisco product MIBs are all located under 1.3.6.1.4.1.9 or 
iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprises.cisco subtree.  This nature of MIBs to be created 
in a standard format and created by virtually anyone is one of SNMPs greatest strengths.  
Upon purchase of a new Cisco device, one can download the relevant MIBs created by 
Cisco and simply incorporate them into the existing management framework.  At which 
time a network administrator can enjoy the numerous gains offered by the device-specific 
MIB.  It’s important to note that both the management station and the Agent residing on a 
managed asset have to have the same MIBs to work from.  A management station must 
load the same MIBs that the Agent is using in order to view or configure the variables in 
that MIB. 
 In addition to OID, and whether or not an object is scalar or columnar, SMI also 
defines, for each object type, the various types of data that the object can hold.  Like 
SNMP itself, SMI has gone through revisions.  Accordingly, SMI for SNMPv1 was 
called “SMIv1,” and had only ten data types available to it.  The second version of SMI, 
SMIv2, was published in response to the shortcomings identified by the user community 
who had worked with SNMPv1 as defined by SMIv1.  SMIv2 added new data types, and, 
as it is the current standard, the data type discussion will be limited to the following: 
• Integer32 – Any positive or negative number.  The maximum value of Integer32 
is +/- 231-1 or +/- 2,147,483,647. 
• INTEGER (enumerated) – In this instance of INTEGER the values associated 
with either positive or negative numbers are assigned a label.  For example, the 
status of a port on a network device could be 1(up), 2(down), 3(unknown). 
• Unsigned32 – This data type contains non-negative numbers from 0 to 232-1. 
• Gauge32 – This data type is synonymous with Unsigned32 as it also contains 
non-negative numbers from 0 to 232-1.  However, Gauge32 does have a specific 
behavior defined that states that Gauge32 will only return values within its range 
regardless of the actual value.  This is analogous to a thermometer with a range of 
0o to 100o showing 100o even if the temperature is 112o. 
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• Counter32 – The Counter32 data type is a non-negative integer from 0 to 232.  
This data type differs from Gauge32 in that Gauge32 is meant to fluctuate up and 
down and Counter32 is not.  Counter32 increments upwards until it reaches the 
upper limit of 232 and then wraps back to the original starting number (which can 
be defined as non-zero). 
• Counter64 – Counter64 is the same as Counter32 except that its maximum 
possible value is 264. 
• TimeTicks – This data type is used to count the number of hundredths of a second 
in between two events.  The maximum value of TimeTicks is 232, which is 
roughly equivalent to 497 days at which time the TimeTicks counter will wrap 
back to a starting value of 0. 
• OCTET STRING – This data type specifies octets of binary or textual 
information.  Using ASCII which represents eight binary bits (an octet) as an 
alpha character (A,B,C,etc.) this fields can store text.  Additionally, OCTET 
STRING can store IP or MAC addresses as both can be represented in octet 
strings. 
• OBJECT IDENTIFIER – This data type is synonymous with the numerical OID 
number that references an object in the hierarchical OID tree. 
• Ip Address – This data type of four octets was designed to store IPv4 values. 
• Opaque – This data type specifies octets of binary information.  While there was 
no limit to this field in SMIv1, SMIv2 specifies an upper limit of 216-1 octets. 
• BITS – The BITS data type, like INTEGER specifies an enumeration of labeled 
bits. 
This concludes the list of definition possibilities for the creation of object types in 
SMIv2 for SNMP.  All modern MIBs are a collection of objects defined by the above 
rules.  Now that the MIBs have been explained, the next part of the puzzle is to look at 
how the Agent and the NMS work together to manage the collection of objects. 
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E. HOW SNMP WORKS 
 Now that all of the pieces have been identified, here is an example of the process 
of SNMP in use.  Firstly, the end user of an NMS enters a command to retrieve some 
value from a managed asset (although there certainly does not need to be an end user 
involved, as many NMS functions are automated).  The NMS then creates the SNMP 
message with a Request ID, command number distinguishing the various request types, 
community name, and SNMP PDU.  SNMP, being a layer 7 protocol, then hands off the 
message to the other layers of the OSI stack for processing.  The message is ultimately 
sent over UDP port 161 to the receiving host. 
 When an Agent is enabled on a remote host device, in addition to managing the 
various local MIB variables, a primary function of the agent is to listen for an incoming 
request from an NMS.  Upon receipt of such a message the first thing that the agent does 
is to check for proper ASN.1 formatting.  If this check fails, the message is discarded 
with no notification. Should it not fail, the next step is to check the SNMP version 
number. If the version number is incorrect, the message is discarded without notification.  
If the SNMP message passes the first two checks, the next information to be checked is 
the community string.  This is the first time whereby, if a failure occurs, a message is sent 
back to the originating NMS.  At this point, any further failures of the message will 
generate notification back to the NMS about the reason for the failure.  If, however, the 
community string name matches, then the PDU is decoded and processed.  It is important 
to note that if the processing of the message fails due to lack of requested variables, etc., 
a message is sent back to the NMS giving a generic reason for the failure.  When the MIB 
information requested is finished being collected, the Agent then creates a response 
message.  The message contains command number 2 for Get-Response and the same 
request ID as the NMS sent; this allows the NMS to track all incoming Get-Response 
messages.  After the message is created, it is put back on the wire and sent back to the 
NMS for processing, at which point the Agent returns to its default listening state. 
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F. FCAPS REVISITED 
The original conversation about FCAPS was in terms of what FCAPS was and the 
responsibilities of each of the sub divisions. The following section will describe SNMP’s 
contributions to each of the components of the FCAPS model. 
• Fault Management – through the methods of polling and trapping, SNMP can 
provide a near real-time picture of what devices are, and, more importantly, what 
devices are not operating properly on the network.  In the event of a fault, traps 
can be used to immediately notify a network manager via a console or even a cell 
phone.  In the event that the Trap fails, the NMS can use a backup low frequency 
polling method to detect faults where no traps were received. SNMP can also be 
used to help isolate faults from affecting the rest of the network in addition to 
providing alarm correlation capabilities. The concept of high availability is about 
ensuring that services provided by IT are available whenever an end user needs 
them.  This is obviously important in the case of a soldier relying on information 
from an IEEE Std. 802.16 BS.  Along with reducing single points of failure, one 
of the key aspects of high availability is fault detection.  After all, the sooner a 
fault is detected the sooner it can be resolved.  Though in the early days of SNMP 
this Fault Management capability was limited to routers and switches, now the 
capability has expanded to include UPS, printers, workstations, and software.  
With this increased functionality, SNMP is no longer limited to monitoring 
network-support devices only (as the original protocol was designed to do), but is 
now capable of monitoring every device connected to the network as well. 
• Configuration Management – SNMP provides configuration management on 
several levels.  First off, by using ICMP messages (more commonly known as 
“ping” messages), many current NMS software suites can perform a discovery of 
the network creating a logical topology of the network.  This initial mapping in 
combination with trapping and polling can be used as a baseline network level 
configuration in which the NMS can detect and record changes.  SNMP can also 
detect and record changes on the device level as well.  As SNMP is built into the 
initial distributions of more and more hardware and software assets, increasingly 
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there are fewer and fewer either configuration or state variables an asset can have 
that can’t be managed by SNMP.  As these variables change, traps can be sent to 
the NMS such that any change either on the network level or the device level can 
be logged. 
• Accounting Management – with traps designed to fire at user logon, SNMP can 
track total times a user is logged on, and total network resources consumed by any 
particular user.  Current market products such as Cisco’s NAC (Network Access 
Control) product line rely on SNMP to either permit or deny an end user access to 
the network.   
• Performance Management – SNMP, using its combination of polling and 
trapping, can monitor for bottlenecks and track usage trends for capacity 
planning. This capacity planning in turn allows for intelligent preventative 
maintenance. In addition to merely tracking traffic patterns, SNMP can track 
operating temperatures and CPU usage to not only give a picture of how any 
given device is performing, but the network as a whole as well. 
• Security Management – as mentioned, Cisco’s NAC product line, after receiving 
authentication information from a user, uses SNMP to enable the physical port the 
user is connected to, or to disable it, thereby preventing access to the network.  
SNMP can increase the security posture of any network by tracking user statistics, 
and providing a wealth of information designed to keep the network operating at 
peak efficiency and reducing costly down times.  
 
 As should be obvious by now, the benefits of SNMP are numerous to say the 
least.  It is lightweight, ubiquitous in the networking field, and anyone can contribute to 
the wealth of functionality already attributed to it.  These benefits have not gone 
unnoticed by the IEEE 802.16 working group, as they have included a MIB as an 
amendment to the standard. 
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IV. 802.16F 
In 2005, the 802.16 working group published IEEE Std. 802.16f, which is an 
amendment to the IEEE 802.16 standard and which introduces a default MIB for use in 
IEEE Std. 802.16 implementations.  Up until the release of 802.16f, different vendors 
were free to use or create whatever MIB they felt appropriate for their individual 
implementations.  This type of vendor specific usage of MIBs can lead to interoperability 
issues as well as consumer headaches when choosing a specific vendor’s implementation. 
The IEEE Std. 802.16 MIB contains two MIB modules: wmanIfMib and 
wmanDevMib.  The wmanIfMib module defines the managed objects germane to the 
IEEE Std. 802.16 interface.  The wmanDevMib module, on the other hand, deals with the 
managed objects germane to devices that implement the IEEE Std. 802.16 interface. Each 
of these two MIB modules is further broken down into three areas, each dealing with the 










 The remainder of this chapter will explore in detail the hierarchy of managed 
objects in these two MIB modules.  However, before the conversation about specific MIB 
values begins, it is important to understand how a data abstraction known as a Textual 
Convention can be used to increase the number of possible data types available to 
objects.  
 Textual Conventions are definitions that can be included into a MIB to make 
programming the MIB significantly easier.  As mentioned previously, object types can 
  54
only be configured to hold one of several data types. (INTEGER, Counter32, Gauge32, 
OCTET STRING, etc.)  Textual Conventions are a way to manipulate these “primitive” 
data types into more useful abstractions.  For example, a very common use of a Textual 
Convention is that of Display String as defined in MIB-II: 
DisplayString ::= 
              OCTET STRING 
          -- This data type is used to model textual information taken 
          -- from the NVT ASCII character set.  By convention, objects 
          -- with this syntax are declared as having 
 
          -- 
          --      SIZE (0.255) [15]  
 
 Note that none of the primitive data types can hold alpha characters, that is, 
human readable letters of the alphabet.  To deal with this shortcoming, the Display String 
Textual Convention uses the ASCII character set (a character set that uses 8 bits or 1 byte 
of data to represent an alpha character) in combination with the OCTET STRING data 
type to define a way to insert human readable alpha characters into a MIB.  Textual 
Conventions are extremely useful in that once defined, they allow a programmer to create 
just about any data type imaginable, so long as it can be derived from the 12 original data 
types.  Below is an example of a Textual Convention specific to 802.16f: 
 
WmanIfIpVersionType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION 
 STATUS  current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "The object of this type indicates the version of IP used 
  on the Secondary Management Connection. The values should 
  be undefined if the 2nd management CID doesn't exist." 
 REFERENCE 
  "Subclause 11.7.4 in IEEE Std 802.16-2004" 
 SYNTAX  INTEGER  {undefined(0), 
     ipv4(1), 
                ipv6(2)} 
 
  
This example illustrates how the WmanIfIpVersionType Textual Convention 
defines how the values of INTEGER can be used to convey the three possible version 
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states of an IP connection.  It is important to note that all SNMP communications work in 
this fashion. 
 Should an administrator decide that they want to shut down an interface on a 
networking device, the control message (a SET message) that goes from the NMS to the 
Agent is not “shut down port x.”  In the case of a Set command, the control message 
passes a numerical value which, through the use of the SMI definitions and the Textual 
Convention definitions, can be construed by the Agent as a prompt for a specific action.  
In the case of a Get command (for the version of IP being used in this case), the NMS 
would query the object that uses WmanIfIpVersionType as its SYNTAX type.  Were the 
IP connection IPv4, the Agent would return the value “1,” which would then be 
interpreted by the corresponding MIB on the NMS to a value of IPv4.  This is just 
another way in which SNMP helps to keep the traffic being generated lightweight; 
instead of having to pass human readable values, it can pass simple numerical values 





Figure 9.   wmanIfMib Structure 
 
 The first of the MIB modules defined in 802.16f is wmanIfMib, which defines 
management objects relevant to the IEEE Std. 802.16 broadband wireless interface.  The 
figure above illustrates a high level view of the MIB.  The wmanIfMib, like the 
wmanDevMib module, is further broken down into three subtrees, the first of these being 
wmanIfBsObjects. 
1. wmanIfBsObjects 
 wmanIfBsObjects, though under the wmanIfMib, is still a subtree and not a leaf.  
As such, it holds no object data of its own. Instead, it holds the next subtree, 
wmanIfBsPacketCs.  
 
The following object groups are defined for use in all BS: 
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Figure 10.   wmanIfBsPacketCs Structure 
 
 wmanIfBsPacketCs, as a subtree itself, holds the leaf values as shown in Figure 
11.  This subgroup of leaves contains values germane to the Packet CS Management 
entity layer, which deals with the Convergence Sublayer of IEEE Std. 802.16 which 
prepares layer three protocol traffic for the IEEE Std. 802.16 MAC layer.  
wmanIfBsProvisionedSfTable 
 This columnar object contains provisioned service flow profiles for SS.  Its 
SYNTAX (data type) is a sequence (or rows) of objects wmanIfBsProvisionedEntry, 
which is itself a listing of object variables pertinent to the state of a service flow of a SS. 
wmanIfBsProvisionedForSfTable 
 This object maps the MAC address of an SS to a service flow.  This can be used 
to enable multicast where multiple MAC addresses are mapped to the same service flow. 
wmanIfBsServiceClassTable 
 This object contains QoS relevant parameters by using a sequence of objects, 
wmanIfBsServiceClassEntry, each of which itself lists specific QoS values, such as 
allowed jitter or latency. 
wmanIfBsClassifierRuleTable 
 This object uses a sequence of wmainIfBsClassfierRuleEntry to index 
classification rules for service flows.  This table, along with the Service Class table, are 
both referenced by the Provisioned Service Flow table above to create a complete picture 
of packet QoS, and service flow association from CS to the CPS. 
wmanIfBsSsPacketCounterTable 
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 This object tracks the number of packets in and out of any particular service flow.  
It uses a sequence of the object, wmanIfBsSsPacketCounterEntry, which itself is a list of 




Figure 11.   wmanIfBsCps Structure 
 
 The wmanIfBsCps MIB subtree deals with objects related to the CPS layer of the 
BSMAC implementation. 
wmanIfBsRegisteredSsTable 
 As the name implies, this object tracks SS which have registered with the BS 
through the RNG-REQ and RNG-RSP process.  It uses a sequence of 
WmanIfBsRegisteredSsEntry to list such connection variables as MAC address and 
Primary and Secondary CID values. 
wmanIfBsConfigurationTable 
 This table holds configuration information about the BS default behavior for 
scheduling a second management channel as well as for the CPS scheduler for Adaptive 
Antenna Systems(AAS).  This object uses a sequence of the 
wmanIfBsConfigurationEntry object, which itself is a list of objects that define such 
parameters as UCD and DCD spacing as well as DL/UL-MAP spacing 
wmanIfBsChannelMeasurementTable 
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 This table keeps a record of SS to BS signal strength variables recorded during the 
RNGREQ and RNG-RSP process.  This object uses a sequence of 
WmanIfBsChannelMeasurementEntry, which is itself a list of signal quality 
measurements. 
wmanIfBsCapabilities 
 This subtree contains objects which record the SS and BS capabilities as 
discovered from the RNG-REQ and RNG-RSP process. 
wmanIfBsSsReqCapabilitiesTable 
 This table contains a sequence of WmanIfBsSsReqCapabilitiesEntry which, for 
each entry, defines the SSs capabilities as per the RNG-REQ and RNG-RSP process. 
wmanIfBsSsRspCapabilitiesTable 
 This table contains a record of the capabilities used by BS and SS as negotiated 
by the REQ and RNG-RSP process. 
wmanIfBsBasicCapabilitiesTable 
 This table, like the wmanIfBsSsReqCapabilitiesTable, defines the capabilities 
available to the BS as defined by BS hardware and software.  It is the information 
combined in these two tables that makes up the capability negotiation framework.   
wmanIfBsCapabilitiesConfigTable 
 A BS has a certain number of capabilities out of the box. This object is used to 
restrict the number of raw capabilities that the BS is capable of for compliance with 
certain regulatory requirements where applicable. 
wmanIfBsSsActionsTable 
 This table also records values relating to regulatory restrictions; however it refers 
to the SS instead of the BS.  This table contains values regarding what and how the SS is 
allowed to transmit. 
 




 The wmanIfBsPkmObjects subtree contains objects germane to the Security 
Sublayer in IEEE Std. 802.16 and managed by the BS. 
wmanIfBsPkmBaseTable 
 This table contains a sequence of occurrences of object, wmanIfBsPkmBaseEntry, 
which, per SS, lists PKM variables such as AK and TEK lifetimes, as well as counts of 
authorization/ authentication requests and replies. 
wmanIfBsSsPkmAuthTable 
 This table tracks a more robust set of per SS authentication and authorization 
variables.  This object tracks the various SAs between BS and SS. 
wmanIfBsPkmTekTable 
 This table tracks the array of TEKs distributed to the various SS.  Example 
variables are Security Association ID (SAID) and the data encryption algorithm used per 
TEK. 
 




 This subtree breaks from the pattern thus far, and does not contain any objects 
referencing the nature of any specific connections between BS and SS, but instead 
defines the types of notification that can be used in IEEE Std. 802.16. 
wmanIfBsTrapControl 
 This subtree contains objects defining what traps can be sent back to an NMS for 
error reporting. 
wmanIfBsTrapControlRegister 
 This first leaf object under wmanIfBsNotification defines what BS traps are 
enabled for reporting to the NMS. 
wmanIfBsStatusTrapControlRegister 
 This object defines status notifications from the BS to the NMS.  It differs from 
the above trap notifications in that these messages are not about what traps are allowed, 
but instead, these traps communicate information about connection success or failure 
events. 
wmanIfBsThresholdConfigTable 
 This table allows a network administrator to set integer thresholds in units of dBm 
(decibels per milliwatt) of received signal strength.  This Received Signal Strength 
Indication (RSSI) threshold, once crossed, then generates a traps back to the NMS.  
wmanIfBsTrapDefinitions 
 This object contains all possible notification and trap types that a BS can receive 
from an SS. 
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Figure 14.   wmanIfBsPhy Structure 
 
wmanIfBsPhy 
 The wmanIfBsPHy subtree contains the last of the BS specific interface subtrees, 
one for OFDM and one for OFDMA.  Without belaboring the point, every leaf under this 
subtree defines a physical characteristic of the channels to and from BS and SS.  The 
variables make specific reference to DL/UL frequency values, DCD/UCD values, frame 
durations, burst profiles, modulations etc.  Whereas the previous objects varied in the 
nature of what they defined, the objects in this subtree all define the physical connection 
characteristics between BS and SS. 
2. wmanIfSsObjects 
 The second of the subtrees under the wmanIfMib module is the wmanIfSsObjects 
subtree.  This subtree refers specifically to managed objects residing in the SS.  Whereas 
every BS must implement the 802.16f MIB as per the standard, only a managed SS is 
required to enable the MIB.  If, however, the SS is a managed device and the MIB is 
implemented in full, the high-level view of the SS Interface Objects MIB looks identical 
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to the BS Interface Objects MIB, with the notable exception of a Packet CS object.  As 
all service flows are defined at, and managed by, the BS, the subtrees and objects 
associated with the creation and management of these variables are not needed in the 
SS’s implementation of its MIB.  Another difference between the BS and SS subtrees is 
that the BS objects need to at any time be able to reference the sum of all SS that are 
connected while the SS need only define its unique connection with one BS.  Below is an 
example of how the same high-level object can look different upon close inspection: 
 
wmanIfBsConfigurationEntry OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX WmanIfBsConfigurationEntry 
 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible 
 STATUS current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "This table is indexed by ifIndex with  
  an ifType of propBWAp2Mp." 
 INDEX { ifIndex } 
 ::= { wmanIfBsConfigurationTable 1 } 
 
WmanIfBsConfigurationEntry ::= SEQUENCE { 
 wmanIfBsDcdInterval   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsUcdInterval  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsUcdTransition   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsDcdTransition   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsInitialRangingInterval   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsSsULMapProcTime   Unsigned32, 
 wmanIfBsSsRangRespProcTime  Unsigned32, 
 wmanIfBsT5Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsT9Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsT13Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsT15Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsT17Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsT27IdleTimer   Unsigned32, 
 wmanIfBsT27ActiveTimer   Unsigned32, 
 wmanIfBs2ndMgmtDlQoSProfileIndex  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBs2ndMgmtUlQoSProfileIndex  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsAutoSfidEnabled   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsAutoSfidRangeMin   Unsigned32, 
 wmanIfBsAutoSfidRangeMax   Unsigned32, 
 wmanIfBsAasChanFbckReqFreq  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsAasBeamSelectFreq   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsAasChanFbckReqResolution  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsAasBeamReqResolution  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsAasNumOptDiversityZones  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfBsResetSector   INTEGER} 
wmanIfSsConfigurationEntry OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX WmanIfSsConfigurationEntry 
 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible 
 STATUS current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "This table is indexed by ifIndex." 
 INDEX { ifIndex } 
 ::= { wmanIfSsConfigurationTable 1 } 
 
WmanIfSsConfigurationEntry ::= SEQUENCE { 
 wmanIfSsLostDLMapInterval   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsLostULMapInterval   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsContentionRangRetries  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsRequestRetries   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsRegRequestRetries   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsTftpBackoffStart   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsTftpBackoffEnd   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsTftpRequestRetries   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsTftpDownloadRetries   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsTftpWait    INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsToDRetries   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsToDRetryPeriod   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT1Timeout    INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT2Timeout    INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT3Timeout    INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT4Timeout    INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT6Timeout    INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT12Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT14Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT16Timeout  INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT18Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT19Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT20Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT21Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsSBCRequestRetries   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsTftpCpltRetries   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsT26Timeout   INTEGER, 
 wmanIfSsDLManagProcTime   INTEGER} 
 
Figure 15.   Comparison of BS and SS Object Type Configuration Entry 
 
 Even a cursory glance reveals the significant difference in data types and number 
of objects referenced in the BS and SS Configuration Entry object.  It is important to note 
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these differences and it is why it cannot simply be assumed that because two subtrees 
look identical that they in fact are identical. 
 
Figure 16.   wimanIfSsCps structure 
 
wmanIfSsCps 
 wmanIfCps is the first subtree under wmanIfSsObjects and, like its BS, has no 
object variables.  This subtree contains the two leaves that define the CPS layer 
configuration information for the various connections between BS and SS. 
wmanIfSsConfigurationTable 
 This table, unlike its BS counterpart, only contains one row.  The object variables 
are stored in a sequence of wmanIfSsConfigurationEntry (as illustrated on the previous 
page), which itself is a listing of pertinent connection variables for the SS. 
wmanIfSsChannelMeasurementTable 
 This table tracks through the use of a histogram reflecting RSSI and Carrier to 
Interference-plus-Noise-Ratio (CINR) signal quality measurements from BS to SS. 
 
 
Figure 17.   wmanIfSsPkmObjects Structure 
 
wmanIfSsPkmObjects 
 This subtree, as does its BS counterpart, defines connection objects germane to 
the Security Sublayer for the IEEE Std. 802.16 stack. 
wmanIfSsPkmAuthTable 
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 As mentioned previously, it is the job of the SS to authenticate itself to the BS, 
and the BS does not need to authenticate itself to any SS.  Thus, this table contains 
information regarding the authentication process from SS to BS.  Information such as key 
lifetimes and authentication error codes are stored here. 
wmanIfSsPkmTekTable 
 This table contains one row per TEK.  Each SAID spawns uniquely one TEK, and 
everything from the encryption method used in the TEK to the key lifetime of the TEK 
are stored here. 
wmanIfSsDeviceCertTable 
 This table contains the values of the X.509 SS certificate and manufacturers 
certificate per SS interface. 
 
Figure 18.   wmanIfSsNotification Structure 
 
wmanIfSsNotification 
 The wmanIfSsNotification subtree mirrors the wmanIfBsNotification subtree 
except that, instead of the variables and values residing on the BS, they reside on the SS. 
wmanIfSsTrapControl 
 This subtree groups all of the notifications possible for any SS. 
wmanifSlTrapControlRegister 
 This object is used to activate or deactivate various levels of notifications (traps) 
for the SS.  While similar to the BS version, the SS version of this object contains no 
references to PKM or Registration events 
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wmanIfSsThresholdConfigTable 
 While it is more common for the BS and SS objects to have different objects and 
data types defined for them, this object is an exception in that the Threshold Config table 
measured the same RSSI values and even uses the same data types to record them. 
wmanIfSsTrapDefinitions 
 As its name implies, this object contains a list of all of the objects available to the 
Control Register table for notification. 
 
 
Figure 19.   wmanIfSsPhy Structure 
 
wmanIfSsPhy 
 The wmanIfSsPhy subtree, like the PHY subtree for the BS, defines the 
characteristics of the physical connection between SS and BS.  Again, objects here define 
such characteristics as UCD and DCD as well as frequency ranges and frame lengths.  
This subtree is also one of the few subtrees that resemble the BS subtree upon closer 




Figure 20.   wmanIfCmnPacketCs Structure 
 The wmanIfCommonObjects subtree contains objects that are germane to session 
properties without any bias to whether they are on a BS or SS.  These objects describe 
global conditions of the connection which both SS and BS must maintain. 
wmanIfCmnPacketCs 
 This subtree defines CS objects common to both the SS and BS. 
wmanIfCmnClassifierRuleTable 
 For each Service Flow that is opened from the BS to SS, there are a number of 
relevant parameters for that Service Flow.  The rows in the Classifier Rule Table define 
each of the service flows in terms of IP addresses, priority, MAC addresses, 
source/destination ports, etc. 
wmanIfCmnPhsRuleTable 
 In some applications, Voice over IP (VoIP) for instance, a number of VoIP PDUs 
may be put into one Layer 2 frame.  If this is the case, then all of the header information 
for those packets (Source Address, Destination Address, QoS parameters) will be 
redundant.  In order to lessen overhead associated with such communications, Payload 
Header Suppression groups a number of packets under one header.  The PHS Rule Table 
keeps track of the data streams using PHS and what service flows are associated with 
what PHS rules on both ends of the connection to ensure that PHS packets arrive when 
and where they need to. 
 
Figure 21.   wmanIfCmnCps Structure 
wmanIfCmnCps 
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 This subtree contains objects germane to the CPS sublayer required by both the 
SS and the BS. 
wmanIfCmnCpsServiceFlowTable 
 This table indexes a number of variables that pertain to the CPS layer of various 
Service Flows.  Information such as MAC addresses, priority, tolerated jitter and latency, 
and Service Flow ID (SFID), are stored here, one row per Service Flow. 
wmanIfCmnBsSsConfigurationTable 
 This table contains objects that define the timeouts and acceptable retry iterations 
for ranging requests as well as Automatic Repeat Requests (ARQ), as well as Dynamic 
Service Additions, Service Changes, and Service Deletions (DSA/DSC/DSD).  This 
object resident on the SS must match the variable values on the BS with which it 
communicates. 
 
Figure 22.   wmanIfCmnPkmObjects Structure 
 
wmanIfCmnPkmObjects 
 This subtree contains Security Sublayer objects shared between BS and SS. 
wmanIfCmnCryptoSuiteTable 
 This lone PKM table object contains rows for the pairing of cryptographic 
methods used by the BS and SS.  Each row contains values for the authentication method, 




Figure 23.   wmanDevMib Structure 
This next set of MIB objects is a departure from the last group in that they are not 
associated with the interface between BS and SS.  Every subtree and leaf within 
wmanIfMIB dealt with the storing and manipulation of variables that had a direct effect 
on the nature of the physical connection between BS and SS.  This MIB, however, has no 
such objects, and concerns itself with system state variables for BS and SS alike.  
Another point of note is that the wmanIfMib and the wmanDevMib are under completely 
separate hierarchy chains under the SMI model.  While wmanIfMib was under 
1.3.6.1.2.1.10.1841, wmanDevMib is under 1.0.8802.16.1.   
1. wmanDevBsObjects 
 This subtree contains objects germane to the BS hardware and software. 
wmanDevBsSoftwareUpgradeTable 
 This object table contains rows that identify information about the current running 
version of software on the BS.  Information like Vendor ID, Software file name, and the 
timestamp of the last new software upgrade can all be found here. 
                                                 
1 IANA has published an updated version of the SMI OID hierarchy in which the 
.184(propBWAp2Mp) subtree has been depreciated and replaced with the .237(ieee80216WMAN) subtree.  
However, the 802.16 Working Group has, as of this writing, not published an updated 802.16-2004 or 
802.16f standard to reflect this change.  As such, this thesis will refer to the depreciated 
.184(propBWAp2Mp) subtree for the sake of consistency given the use of the 802.16f standard. 
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Figure 24.   wmanDevBsNotification Structure 
 
wmanDevBsNotification 
 This subtree contains objects germane to traps about the state of the BS sent to the 
NMS. 
wmanDevBsTrapControl 
 This object defines what trap messages will be sent to the NMS.  There are two 
options to set within the control, one allowing all of the notification types defined in the 
below object and another to inform the NMS that the number of logs currently exceeds 
the log buffer. 
wmanDevBsTrapDefinitions 
 This object contains an index of all of the different types of notification that can 
be used by the BS. 
2. wmanDevSsObjects 
 This subtree contains objects germane to the SS hardware and software. 
wmanDevSsConfigFileEncodingTable 
 This table contains rows that store objects similar to that of the BS Software 
Update table.  It contains hardware and software versions, as well as Vendor ID and 
configuration file parameters.2 
                                                 
2The lack of high level structure for wmanDevSsConfigFileEncodingTable was not an oversight.  It is 




Figure 25.   wmanDevSsNotification Structure 
 
wmanDevSsNotification 
 This subtree contains objects germane to traps about the state of the SS sent to the 
NMS. 
wmanDevSsTrapControl 
 This object defines what trap messages will be sent to the NMS.  There are two 
options to set within the control, one allowing all of the notification types defined in the 
below object, and another to inform the NMS that the number of logs currently exceeds 
the log buffer. 
wmanDevBsTrapDefinitions 
 This object contains an index of all of the different types of notification that can 
be used by the SS. 
3. wmanDevCommonObjects 
wmanDevCommonObjects 
 This subtree defines various event-based objects residing in both SS and BS. 
 
 




 This subtree defines event log parameters for both BS and SS. 
wmanDevCmnEventLogConfigTable 
 This object table contains rows for SS and BS.  Each row contains values 
regarding the size of event logs, the severity of event to log, as well as log buffer sizes 
and the like. 
wmanDevCmnEventTable 
 This table indexes the total number of events that can be used to create log 
messages in both BS and SS. 
wmanDevCmnEventLogTable 
 This table is used to store local events.  The standard states that “this table should 
reside in non-volatile memory that should presist(sic) after power cycle or reboot [16].” 
 
 
Figure 27.   wmanDevCmnSnmpAgent Structure 
 
wmanDevCmnSnmpAgent 
 This subtree contains objects related to the implementation of an SNMP Agent on 
either BS or SS. 
wmanDevCmnSnmpV1V2TrapDestTable 
 This table contains rows that define Agent parameters such as trap destinations 
and trap port number are stored here. 
wmanDevCmnDeviceConfig 
 This object is defined by an enumerated INTEGER SYNTAX which, if set to 0, 
requires no action, but, if set to 1, will reset the device. 
 As is illustrated by the rather exhaustive list of objects in this chapter the MIB 
defined in the 802.16f standard can store any of hundreds of object variables relating to 
both the interface between the BS and SS, and the hardware and software used for the BS 
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and SS, respectively.  The listing of the MIB variables is important, as it provides the 
basis for the ultimate purpose of this thesis.  If there is a way to use SNMP to create a BS 
to SS session that wouldn’t require the SS to constantly respond, it will be found in these 
MIB objects. 
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Now that the foundations of IEEE Std. 802.16-2004, SNMP, and the IEEE Std. 
802.16f have been established, the nature of the thesis can be fully grasped.  The question 
again is whether or not SNMP can be used to create an IEEE Std. 802.16 session between 
BS and SS that does not require the SS to actually be involved in the conversation.  The 
ultimate answer to the question rests on whether or not SNMP can be used to inject, using 
a series of SET commands, information into the BS that would allow it to believe that it 
had an established session with an SS of our choosing.  This faux session could then be 
used to fool the BS into sending the SS information without requiring the SS to respond 
at all. 
A. METHODS 
 The first step to establishing this possibility is to look back to the MIB and see 
what is and what is not of use.  Of the two MIB modules, wmanIfMib and wmanDevMib, 
only the Interface MIB contains values linked to the establishment and use of a 
communications session.  Thusly, the wmanDevMib can be ignored going forward, as it 
adds no values that can be exploited toward the end goal.   
 The second step is to focus on those connection state variables present in a BS 
implementation, and that are not reflected in the wmanIfMib.  All told, there are about 
seven hundred and fifty objects in the 802.16f standard, most of which are found in the 
wmanIfMib module.  To draw each one out, one-by-one for comparison, would be 
exhaustive and ultimately futile.  Due to the robust nature of the 802.16f standard, one 
will find that the MIB has numerous instances where the connection state variables and 
the MIB objects are aligned.  As such, the remainder of this chapter will focus on which 
state variables are absent from the MIB.  To give structure to this conversation it may be 
helpful to return to the previous discussion detailing the setup process the SS goes 
through when initially logging on to a network. 
 As before, this discussion will start with power up of the SS, assuming that a BS 
is already setup to serve the geographic area for our hypothetical SS.  Herein lies the first 
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of the reasons why the aim of this thesis cannot be met by SNMP alone.  The default 
behavior of an SS initially is to listen for a BS transmitting signals it can parse.  If it picks 
up a signal from a BS containing a UL/DL-Map the first thing it will do is synchronize to 
the UL-Map and attempt to make contact with the BS.  Worse yet, it will try to contact 
the BS starting out with the lowest power setting.  This potentially means that the SS will 
broadcast multiple times until it reaches a power level that the BS can receive clearly.  In 
fact, the whole of the start up process causes problems as the default behavior of the SS is 
to establish a connection first and take instruction later. 
 The IEEE Std. 802.16 BS and SS standards were designed such that, out of the 
box, an SS would attempt to create a connection with a local BS.  This process requires a 
number of transmissions back and forth setting up everything from security keys to 
channel description information.  This is of great benefit in the commercial sector as it 
significantly reduces the need for on-site support to any user standing up a SS.  However, 
for the purpose of this thesis, it is a non-trivial hurdle in that this behavior antedates 
SNMP’s ability to manage the asset.  As mentioned previously, SNMP is a layer 7 
networking protocol.  The initial creation of the BS to SS connection starts at layer 1 with 
the negotiation of PHY characteristics, then moves on to layer 2 properties such as 
frames, and then layer 3 variables such as IP addresses and such.  In fact, it is only after 
every dimension of the BS to SS dynamic has been negotiated and set, that SNMP can 
even enter the connection to manage the assets.  This fact alone prevents a truly silent SS.  
However, even if this were not the case, there are several other aspects of the IEEE Std. 
802.16 to 802.16f comparison where a silent SS could not work. 
 Suspending the above complication, another significant area of difficulty is the 
authentication of the SS.  Remember that, for an SS to gain access to the network, it 
needs to authenticate to the BS, which is done through the transmission of X.509 
certificates.  Obviously, if an SS is not transmitting, it cannot transmit the appropriate 
certificates.  This in and of itself is expected.  The desire is to use SNMP to inject 
information into the BS, which creates the illusion of an active SS; however, 
compounding the problem is the fact that the BS MIB does not even allow setting of an 
X.509 variable. 
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 In the half of wmanIfMib dedicated to the SS there is an object, 
wmanIfSsDeviceCertTable.  This object is a sequence of object 
wmanIfSsDeviceCertEntry which, for each SS, holds objects wmanIfSsDeviceCert and 
wmanIfSsDeviceManufCert.  These objects contain the encoded X.509 certificate for 
both the SS and the CA root signed manufacturers certificate. 
-- 
-- Table wmanIfSsDeviceCertTable 
-- 
wmanIfSsDeviceCertTable OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX  SEQUENCE OF  WmanIfSsDeviceCertEntry 
 MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible 
 STATUS  current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "This table describes the PKM device certificates for each 
  SS wireless interface." 
 ::= { wmanIfSsPkmObjects 3 } 
 
wmanIfSsDeviceCertEntry OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX  WmanIfSsDeviceCertEntry 
 MAX-ACCESS  not-accessible 
 STATUS  current  
 DESCRIPTION 
  "Each entry contains the device certificate of one SS." 
INDEX { ifIndex } 
::= { wmanIfSsDeviceCertTable 1 } 
 
WmanIfSsDeviceCertEntry ::= SEQUENCE { 
 wmanIfSsDeviceCert      OCTET STRING, 
 wmanIfSsDeviceManufCert     OCTET STRING} 
 
wmanIfSsDeviceCert OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX  OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..65535)) 
 MAX-ACCESS  read-only 
 STATUS  current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "The X509 DER-encoded subscriber station certificate." 
::= { wmanIfSsDeviceCertEntry 1 } 
 
wmanIfSsDeviceManufCert OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX  OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..65535)) 
 MAX-ACCESS  read-only 
 STATUS  current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "The X509 DER-encoded manufacturer certificate which is 
 signed by the CA root authority certificate." 
::= { wmanIfSsDeviceCertEntry 2 } 
  
However, while there is an SS MIB object to contain the local X.509 certificates, 
there is no corresponding BS object which contains the certificates of all connected SS.  
The next step was to look for an object that would list SS PKM status as either accepted 
or rejected in the hope of being able to set the value to accepted, therefore bypassing the 
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actual certificate exchange.  Fortunately there is such an object type; unfortunately, its 
access type is “read-only,” so no SET messages could be sent to it. 
 
wmanIfBsSsPkmAuthValidStatus OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX  INTEGER {unknown (0), 
    validSsChained (1), 
    validSsTrusted (2), 
    invalidSsUntrusted (3), 
    invalidCAUntrusted (4), 
    invalidSsOther (5), 
    invalidCAOther (6)} 
 MAX-ACCESS read-only 
 STATUS current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "Contains the reason why a SS's certificate is deemed valid 
  or invalid. Return unknown if the SS is running PKM mode. 
  ValidSsChained means the certificate is valid because it 
  chains to a valid certificate. ValidSsTrusted means the 
  certificate is valid because it has been provisioned to be 
  trusted. InvalidSsUntrusted means the certificate is 
  invalid because it has been provisioned to be untrusted. 
  InvalidCAUntrusted means the certificate is invalid 
  because it chains to an untrusted certificate. 
  InvalidSsOther and InvalidCAOther refer to errors in 
  parsing, validity periods, etc, which are attributable to 
  the SS certificate or its chain respectively." 
 ::= { wmanIfBsSsPkmAuthEntry 17 } 
  
 As it turns out, SNMP doesn’t buy much, as the SS by definition transmits all of 
the connection negotiation information before SNMP can even be used.  It also turns out 
that the BS isn’t all that much help either, as even if information were injected into the 
BS via SNMP to create a phantom SS, the PKM variables needed are read-only which 
prevents an NMS from being able to configure those values. 
 Given that SNMP is only an option after the fact of connection establishment; a 
truly silent SS doesn’t seem to be a viable option using SNMP as a mitigating method.  
However, another possibility would be for an SS to establish a session and then go silent.   
 In this amended situation, an SS would power up and proceed to initiate 
communication with a local BS; however, instead of continuing to send and receive 
normally, the SS would then cease transmission and the connections already provisioned 
would be held open in the absence of continued SS communication.  A caveat that 
immediately needs to be addressed is that there would need to be some way of making 
the SS cease communications while keeping provisioned sessions open as well.  While 
the possibility of keeping provisioned connections open via SNMP remains, forcing an 
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SS to cease communications with a BS does not.  As applications on the SS request 
network services, there is currently no way in the IEEE Std. 802.16 standard to prevent 
those requests from being broadcast short of disabling the radio. 
 Given the above caveat, the key to enabling a silent SS after initial negotiation 
would be to artificially manipulate the timers associated with connections such that they 
wouldn’t time out.  For example, when an SS establishes a connection with a BS, the 
MIB variable wmanIfBsSsPkmAuthLifetime is set. 
wmanIfBsSsPkmAuthLifetime OBJECT-TYPE 
 SYNTAX  Integer32 (86400..6048000) 
 UNITS  "seconds" 
 MAX-ACCESS  read-only 
 STATUS  current 
 DESCRIPTION 
  "The value of this object is the lifetime, in seconds, the 
  BS assigns to an authorization key for this SS." 
 REFERENCE 
  "Table 341 in IEEE Std 802.16-2004" 
 DEFVAL  { 604800 } 
 ::= { wmanIfBsSsPkmAuthEntry 5 } 
 
 Notice that the value of the above object is in seconds and that it can be between 
86,400 and 6,048,000 with a default value of 604,800.  This means that, at its maximum, 
this object would create a 70-day timer for an SS authentication key.  Since this upper 
limit is well beyond the battery life of any handheld device capable of hosting an SS, this 
would create the necessary space for the amended silent SS. 
 This process, however, has no need of SNMP to configure.  The BS configuration 
file allows an administrator to set the initial key lifetimes (for both AK and TEK). 
“After an SS completes basic capabilities negotiation, it shall initiate an authorization 
exchange with its BS.  The BS’s first receipt of an Auth Request message from the 
unauthorized SS shall initiate the activation of a new AK, which the BS sends back to the 
requesting SS in an Auth Reply message.  This AK shall remain active unit lit expires 
according to its predefined AK Lifetime, a BS system configuration parameter.” Page 298 
802.16-2004 Std 
 Thus far it has been shown that a silent SS is a practical impossibility under the 
current architecture of IEEE Std. 802.16.  On initial start up, the IEEE Std. 802.16 SS, 
upon receiving a DCD message and DL-Map, will broadcast back to the BS over and 
over again until a connection is established.  Once the connection is established, all seven 
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layers of the OSI stack must be built by multiple negotiation transmissions from SS and 
BS both.  Only after all of this default behavior could SNMP even be considered, as it is 
an application layer protocol.  Even if the transmitter on the SS could be disabled such 
that it could still receive without transmitting, there is currently no combination of SNMP 
SET variable that can be sent to a BS such that it would transmit to an SS with which it 
had not performed initial negotiations.  Finally, were an SS to negotiate an initial 
connection and then stop transmitting, there is a possibility of setting overlong timeouts 
to ensure a continual connection; however, this capability doesn’t require SNMP to be 
set, as it is a standard configuration option of an IEEE Std. 802.16 BS. While the SNMP 
approach fails to meet the goals of this thesis, in researching IEEE Std. 802.16 
capabilities and functionality, another possibility for creating a silent SS implementation 
has become apparent.  To describe this alternative method, a look back to the use case 
example of soldiers surrounding a FOB is warranted. 
B. ALTERNATIVE SILENT SS 
Earlier in this thesis, a FOB use case was crafted to give a framework in which to 
discuss issues relevant to the goal of creating a silent SS.  The need for a stable, robust 
wireless network was identified as a core component, and the distance, throughput, 
reliability, and minimum setup overhead of IEEE Std. 802.16 were shown to make it an 
ideal technology for supporting such use cases. 
It was also identified that concealment was a key component of the mission of 
these forward forces, and, while IEEE Std. 802.16 is a great boon for NCW, its default 
transmission behavior could be used against the soldier using IEEE Std. 802.16 
equipment.  The availability of tools which can detect and locate the source of radio 
transmissions creates an unacceptable risk to forward forces who rely on concealment, 
yet these very forces are the ones that stand to gain the most from NCW, as changing 
COP information is likely to affect them first. 
 So, the question becomes one of how to provide these forces with all the gains of 
NCW enabled equipment without incurring the risk of exposure due to transmission 
detection.  This thesis endeavored to determine whether SNMP could provide this 
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capability.  The default behavior of IEEE Std. 802.16 SS and the values of the IEEE Std. 
802.16f MIB have shown SNMP cannot currently meet this goal today.  Given that 
SNMP cannot support the goal, are there other options? 
 Here it might be useful to review the requirements of such a network connection. 
• The connection should support network connectivity from the FOB to units near 
and far. 
• The connection should be able to be configured such that it supports the 
concealment of those units who rely on concealment (i.e., no transmissions). 
• While not transmitting, the connection should still be able to receive information 
broadcast to it allowing hidden units to benefit from NCW enabled equipment. 
• The information going out need not relate specifically to the end user. A generic 
subset of COP information should be dispersed as widely as possible such that all 
users are reachable. 
 
While the SNMP route failed to provide the functionality desired, could there be 
other options for meeting the above requirements?  Another possibility lies in using a 
proxy SS to communicate on behalf of all the silent SS and transmit to them in a 
broadcast fashion. 
 In this new situation, the BS functions exactly as before.  However, there is one 
fully functional SS communicating with the BS, which is acting as a proxy for all other 
BS.  In this situation the proxy SS would request to send the above mentioned generic 
COP information to a broadcast address at layer two of the OSI model.  At layer two, 
each device on the network has a unique address (MAC Address) to identify it from any 
other host on the network.  However, if information is sent to a special broadcast address 
that data is sent to all hosts on the local network.  Additionally, whereas individual 
network hosts listen for information and ignore all but what is specifically addressed to 
them, broadcast traffic is accepted and processed by every end node in the network.  The 
proxy SS would have to insert itself as a session peer for the network traffic sent from it 
to be broadcast to every other silent SS.  In this way, the proxy SS could constantly 
request that COP information be sent to a broadcast address at which point the BS would 
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then broadcast out the message to all SS within range.  The SS in this situation would 
correctly interpret said traffic as something it should try to process and pass the broadcast 
frame up the OSI stack to the application layer. 
This approach has the advantage of needing no additional 
configurations/modifications on the part of the BS.  Furthermore, since the broadcast 
frames will be received just like any other traffic, there is no need to manipulate any layer 
of the OSI stack to get the SS to accept and process the traffic as it is received.  It should 
be mentioned that this theory has not been borne out by research like the question of 
SNMP, however, it is a plausible next step in creating space for a silent SS to function in 
an IEEE Std. 802.16 implementation.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analyzed IEEE Std. 802.16, SNMP, and IEEE Std. 802.16f in an 
attempt to discern whether or not SNMP could be used to remotely configure an IEEE 
Std. 802.16 Subscriber Station (SS) to receive data while not transmitting in return.  As 
modern military forces seek to exploit the gains of Network Centric Warfare (NCW), the 
question of the best network technology to use becomes an important one.  IEEE Std. 
802.16 (WiMAX) has shown itself to be an optimal choice for extending the reach of the 
internet down to the level of the individual soldier.  The range, throughput, flexibility, 
and ability to function both at the edge and at the core of a network, combined with its 
robust scheduling MAC which remains stable under overload conditions, make IEEE Std. 
802.16 an ideal choice for pushing networking power to the edges of modern 
battlespaces.  However, for all its advantages, the default transmit/receive nature of IEEE 
Std. 802.16 equipment could be exploited by enemy forces and used to pinpoint the 
location of troops equipped with IEEE Std. 802.16 gear.  This thesis focused on the use 
of SNMP in combination with IEEE Std. 802.16 to mitigate said risk while still allowing 
IEEE Std. 802.16 equipped soldiers to download important data.  The research into the 
question of creating a silent SS began in chapter II with the IEEE 802.16 standard. 
 The IEEE 802.16 standard functions at the two lowest layers of the 7 Layer OSI 
reference model.  The 802.16 standard itself is further subdivided in to the additional 
layers of: 
• The Service Specific Convergence Sublayer (CS) which receives traffic from 
various Layer 3 protocols and formats it such that the next lower layer can 
become “protocol agnostic.”  
• The Common Part Sublayer (CPS) which is responsible for the core MAC 
functions of IEEE Std. 802.16 such as medium access, connection management, 
and QoS functions.   
• The Privacy Sublayer which authenticates SS to BS to prevent TOS/DOS and 
encrypts payload data between BS and SS. 
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• The PHY layer which corresponds to layer 1 of the OSI model and deals with the 
means and method of getting signals out into the air. 
 These layers are implemented by the two IEEE Std. 802.16 entities, the BS and 
the SS.  The BS is the central aggregation point for all traffic on the network.  All SS 
must go through the BS, and obey its rules for connection, to transmit data anywhere.  
The BS schedules all of the traffic coming from and going to all SS.  Other than a brief 
window of contention during SS initial sign on, the connections between BS and SS are 
contention free, which allows IEEE Std. 802.16 links to enjoy a very high level of 
communications efficiency as compared to other wireless technologies.  In chapter III, 
SNMP was analyzed as to how it could be used to create a silent SS. 
 SNMP has been shown through the use of the FCAPS model to be an extremely 
useful tool in managing today’s modern network. Through the use of its lightweight 
proven communication scheme, SNMP lends itself well to supporting high availability 
through fault detection and performance management.  By way of the SNMP 
Management Information Base (MIB), it has been shown that SNMP can be used to 
remotely configure networking assets as well as monitor those assets for usage, faults, 
and anomalies.  As the IEEE 802.16 Working Group has released the default MIB for the 
802.16 standard (known as IEEE Std. 802.16f), chapter IV centered on what MIB objects 
could be modified or otherwise manipulated to aid in creating a silent SS. 
 The IEEE Std. 802.16 MIB contains over a thousand objects related to the 
implementation of IEEE Std. 802.16.  These objects are broadly broken up into two MIB 
modules; wmanIfMib describes the nature of the interface between BS and SS, and 
wmanDevMib describes objects related to the specific instances of a BS or SS.  However, 
while the nature of the IEEE Std. 802.16f MIB is robust in chapter V, it was shown to be 
inadequate in configuring an SS to be silent. 
 The use of SNMP and the intersection of IEEE Std. 802.16 and SNMP, embodied 
in the IEEE 802.16f standard, came up short in creating a silent SS in two primary ways. 
• The default behavior of an SS on power up is to transmit in order to locate and 
connect with a local BS.  SNMP is an application and as such resides at layer 7 in 
the OSI model.  When an SS does establish a connection with a BS, it builds that 
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connection layer by layer, so, by the time SNMP configuration is even an option, 
the SS has transmitted back and forth to the BS numerous times, establishing 
layers 1 thru 6. 
• Even if it were possible to mute the default transmissions of a SS, there is no 
combination of SET commands one could issue using SNMP to trick a BS into 
thinking it had an authenticated connection with an SS it had never actually heard 
from.  This is most clearly illustrated by the fact that IEEE Std. 802.16 uses X.509 
certificates to authenticate SS to BS, and in the IEEE Std. 802.16f MIB there are 
no objects to store a phantom certificate. 
A third approach to the problem would be to use SNMP to create overlong 
timeouts such that an SS could establish a connection with a local BS and then go silent.  
The overlong timeouts would then allow the BS to continue transmission even though the 
SS has stopped transmitting.  However, this approach does not require SNMP at all as the 
timeout setting is a regular configuration setting an administrator would set upon standing 
up a BS anyway.  Unfortunately, the research bore out that there was no way to use the 
current combination of IEEE Std. 802.16 and SNMP to create a silent SS, however in the 
research another option came to light which may hold potential for meeting the ends of 
this thesis. 
It was discovered that when a BS sends out initial connection information, it does 
so in a way such that SS who are not yet connected can receive it.  This broadcast traffic 
can be seen and interpreted by all SS within range of the BS regardless of whether they 
have attempted to connect to the BS or not.  Therefore, it is possible to send traffic to an 
SS without that SS having established a prior connection with the BS.  The possible 
implementation of this theory seeks to use the nature of broadcast addressing to send 
traffic from a BS to a broadcast address that every SS would be capable of receiving and 
processing regardless of their connection state with the BS.  In this implementation, one 
SS would establish a connection with the BS and act as a proxy on behalf of all local 
silent SS, requesting pertinent data on their behalf.  This theory however, has not been 
tested like the SNMP approach and remains only a theory. 
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VII. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis focused on using SNMP in combination with a default IEEE Std. 
802.16 implementation to create a connection between an SS and BS where the SS could 
remain silent while still benefitting from the transmissions of the BS.  While this proved 
impossible under current conditions, several other possibilities became apparent during 
the research. The following section briefly discusses several alternative options worth 
further research. 
A. PROXY SS 
A possibility exists for creating a silent SS situation where a single proxy SS, 
fully connected to the local BS, transmits and receives on behalf of the number of silent 
SS in the area.  This approach would have to take advantage of the multicast and 
broadcast capabilities of IEEE Std. 802.16.  While unicast messages are sent from one 
sender to one receiver, multicast (one to many) and broadcast (one to all) are special 
addressing methods which allow a sender to send out only one copy of data to be 
received by either a select number or all other hosts on the network. 
In a unicast transmission, data is sent from the address of the sender to the address 
of the receiver.  If the sender needs to send data to a number of hosts, the overhead 
incurred by sending out copy after copy to each individual receiver can be a significant 
cause of network saturation.  However, by using broadcast/multicast addresses, a sender 
can transmit only one copy of the data, and the network infrastructure will take care of 
the rest.  In the case of multicast, only one copy per transmission is necessary to ensure 
that all interested receivers get the data, and likewise in the case of broadcast, to ensure 
that all hosts on the network get a copy of the data. 
Drawing upon the FOB scenario, a proxy SS could be set up within range of a BS, 
and would constantly request COP data from the Wide Area Network (WAN).  Upon 
receipt, this proxy SS would then send the data to a multicast/broadcast address.  The 
forwarded COP traffic would then go back to the BS which would then be 
multicast/broadcast out to all silent SS.  The proxy SS in this scenario is necessary as 
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there needs to be at least one node requesting traffic from the BS in order for traffic to be 
forwarded to the BS. 
This situation does, however, raise a number of questions about the process of the 
proxy SS concept. 
• Which method, broadcast or multicast, would provide the broadest 
dissemination of data to N number of potential silent SS while allowing for 
the least network saturation? 
• As there are broadcast Layer 3 addresses (IP addresses) and broadcast Layer 2 
addresses (MAC addresses), what gains are associated with using the 
broadcast address of one Layer over the other? 
• Since it has been established that the default behavior of the SS is to transmit, 
how could this behavior be changed such that an SS would be a passive 
receiver? 
• In the proxy SS example, the proxy SS is close to the BS, meaning they would 
negotiate a modulation setting appropriate for nearby BS and SS.  However, 
the goal would be to service SS that are at the far reaches of the BS range.  
How could the BS be configured to broadcast data using a modulation which 
favors range over throughput, when the proxy SS is using a modulation which 
favors throughput over range? 
B. LPI PHY 
As has been shown, the IEEE Std. 802.16 PHY layer can be modified again and 
again to meet the ever-changing needs of the consumer.  So long as the new PHY 
conforms to the Layer1/Layer2 SAP, new PHY layers can be created arbitrarily.  One 
possibility, which would obviate the need for a silent SS, but would still mitigate the risk 
of exposure due to transmission tracking, is that of a LPI PHY.  With a LPI PHY the BS 
and SS could still communicate with each other in full duplex fashion, however, since the 
PHY method is LPI there is no additional risk associated in transmitting back and forth. 
An example scenario would be if the LPI PHY developed for IEEE Std. 802.16 
worked like Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA).  In CDMA the transmitter 
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multiplies the intended transmission signal by a pseudo-noise code which spreads the 
energy of the signal over a wider band.   This spread out signal, when transmitted, looks 
to the outside observer (in fact to anyone without the pseudo-noise code) as mere 
background noise.  Upon receipt, the known pseudo-noise code can be used to recover 
the original signal.   
This LPI method would be of significant benefit as it provides gains not only in 
the protection of soldiers, but in the protection of data.  It should be noted that the SS 
usage of the lowest power settings for transmission to the BS is already a good LPI 
measure, however it still lends itself to detection if a tracking device is close enough.  If a 
true LPI measure is employed, then the questions associated with Layer 2 security 
become moot.  If the signal can only be received by the indented recipient then the LPI 
approach adds data confidentiality as well as physical exposure protection all in one 
modification. 
However, while the LPI method does hold promise, a number of questions arise 
out of its proposed use. 
• An LPI approach like CDMA would be contention based.  As one of the gains 
associated with IEEE Std. 802.16, and perhaps the most significant, is its 
scheduling MAC layer, which is stable under overload conditions, the question 
then becomes, “Is there a way to implement LPI technology while keeping the 
scheduling MAC and contention free connections?” 
• As the pseudo-noise code used in CDMA spreads the signal over a much wider 
band, would the modulation techniques used in IEEE Std. 802.16 be affected by 
changes in signal energy? 
• If a LPI PHY were implemented in IEEE Std. 802.16, what would the effect be on 
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